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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers in the influence of culture on strategic decision-making processes in 
Japan and China. It applies strategic culture and operational code analysis to two 
historical case studies, Japan in 1941 and China in 1954, and considers primary source 
documents from both cases. Through this analysis, the thesis assesses the strengths and 
weaknesses of both research perspectives and develops a composite view of decision 
making for both Japan and China. It determines that elements of culture, manifested 
through strategic culture and operational code, had a significant influence on decision 
making in both cases, but that it cannot entirely supplant structural theories of 
international relations in determining state behavior. It suggests some future research 
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A. OBJECTIVES AND RELEVANCE OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis will attempt to increase understanding of the extent to which 
characteristics of the theories of strategic culture and operational code were exhibited in 
the historical decision-making processes of China and Japan. It will attempt to answer 
and illustrate the question “Do these theories show different characterizations of decision 
making in each country, and how did they differ, both by case and by theory?” This will 
be accomplished by applying each theory to historical cases to develop a better overall 
characterization of the decision-making process. The value of assessing two cases is that 
it not only allows for an interesting comparison that adds value to our understanding of 
actors facing similar pressures, but it also allows for a critical evaluation of these two 
perspectives. Importantly, it also allows for the analysis of whether cultural factors 
influence decision making and how they do so. 
The objectives of this thesis are therefore threefold: first, to determine whether it 
is possible to generate a clearer view of decision making in Japan and China viewed 
through these lenses of analysis; second, to determine how the cases differ and what that 
means for the broader study of decision making; third, to determine whether different 
theories give different characterizations of decision making within each case, or whether 
decision making shows common characteristics when viewed through different lenses. I 
will consider two specific historical events: the Japanese decision to declare war on the 
United States in 1941 and the Chinese decision making in relation to the Geneva 
Conference in 1954.  
This thesis has relevance for modern decision makers and strategists. First, it 
examines the decision-making processes of states facing difficult strategic choices. 
Understanding the influence of cultural factors on decision making can help predict how 
an adversary will address difficult strategic problems, making it easier to craft a response. 
This is true whether or not there is a cultural influence. Second, it examines two countries 
of great importance in Asia: Japan and China. As China grows, there is the possibility 
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that it will attempt to become a regional hegemon. Despite its current difficulties, Japan 
has growing military capabilities and significant economic potential for regional 
influence, particularly if China stumbles in the future. Assessing decision making in the 
two cases will lead to a better understanding of when states decide to engage in conflict 
and how they assess peace opportunities, particularly if deep strategic cultural arguments 
find support in the subsequent analysis. In this way it should shed light on the 
significance of culture in decision making. 
Another reason this thesis is relevant to modern decision makers is because of its 
methodology. The perspectives of strategic culture and operational code were chosen for 
their relevance to the study of culture in the realm of decision making. Cultural factors 
like those described by these lenses are difficult to quantify, which makes researching 
them difficult. But if cultural factors could be isolated and demonstrated to have a 
significant effect on decision making, it would be valuable for considering modern-day 
decision making. Cultural factors are not just ones based on history, but those based on 
shared practices and beliefs that stretch back hundreds of years and which should persist 
to the present. While situations change and culture adapts to that, a kernel of a shared 
culture is said to persist across time, and if that can be isolated in Japanese and Chinese 
decision making, it should be very valuable for strategic interactions in the present.  If 
culture is not found, there is still value for modern decision making, as strategists can rely 
upon other theories of international relations to think about how to engage with these 
states. 
This thesis is important for several other reasons. First, it will add to the 
understanding of Japanese and Chinese decision making during the time periods under 
analysis. It will attempt to create a clearer picture of decision making on the basis of the 
three theories used. The existing literature explains the decisions to some extent, but it 
does not adequately address cultural or organizational aspects of decision making for 
either case. These aspects could be important for understanding these cases, where the 
countries share cultural traditions very different from those in the west. 
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B.  SELECTION OF CASES 
Why are Japan and China suitable for comparison? Japan and China exhibited 
similar characteristics during the periods in question. They were both authoritarian 
regimes dominated by deeply held traditions tracing their roots to thousands of years they 
had both recently experienced military success, and they both had expansionist aims. 
Moreover, they both faced strong opposition to their military and political objectives 
from regional actors and larger powers in the international system. Most importantly, at 
some levels, their decision-making processes were similar. Both states used a central 
committee of military and government leaders for major decisions. These bodies would 
deliberate in the same general way to arrive at a political decision. A comparison between 
the two cases, which involve different states with similar strategic constraints, should 
allow for a better understanding of decision making in both. If they face similar strategic 
constraints but exhibit different decision-making styles, the influence of non-structural 
variables should be important. 
This comparison is important for a second reason. It allows one to characterize the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the lenses of analysis, not to determine which theory 
is superior, but to better understand the circumstances and types of data under which they 
can be used. Put another way, this thesis will test the theories to determine their relative 
validity with respect to the chosen cases and the available data. This is another reason 
why it is important to consider two cases; the cases differ greatly in their context and the 
data available, and the extent to which different or consistent results are generated by 
application of these theories have a bearing not only on the relevance of the theories, but 
also on the historical interpretation of the cases themselves. 
Third, this thesis will demonstrate how the usage of multiple lenses of analysis 
adds value to the analysis of decision making. Decision making is based not just on 
structural pressures facing state actors, but also individual belief systems, socialization, 
cultural norms, and organizational processes. This thesis will demonstrate how those 
intervening variables enrich assessments of decision making. Traditional theories of 
international politics may explain state behavior much of the time, but for those 
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circumstances where states make “irrational” choices, it is worthwhile to consider 
whether other schools of thought can shed light on choices. 
This thesis will therefore have methodological, historical, and substantive 
significance, as it seeks to strengthen knowledge about historical decision making and 
tests the channels by which that analysis is conducted. It does not claim to generate a 
predictive, unified theory of decision making, but it will shed light on different ways to 
analyze decision making and make some historical discoveries along the way. 
The remainder of this introduction consists of a literature review followed by a 
discussion of data and research methodology. An outline of the thesis concludes this 
chapter. 
C.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The academic literature has addressed both Japanese and Chinese decision 
making in the cases in question, but has never considered them through the viewpoints 
used in this thesis. In fact, some of the viewpoints considered in this thesis have rarely 
been applied to historical cases, when it has been shown that it would be valuable to do 
so. Therefore, the contribution of this study will fill a gap not only in the historiography 
of these cases, but also in larger debates about methodological approaches. 
Past authors have taken a dim view of Japanese decision making prior to the 
declaration of the Pacific War, describing it variously as irrational,1 subordinate to the 
aggressive tendencies of the army,2 dysfunctional in its execution,3 and schizophrenic in 
its approach to doctrine.4 Other scholars have suggested that the Japanese army also 
seemed to exhibit a rigidity and lack of imagination that was complemented by a cultural 
                                                 
1 David M. Gordon, “The China-Japan War, 1931–1945,” The Journal of Military History 70 (2006): 
142. 
2 Charles R. Viale, Prelude to War: Japan’s Goals and Strategy in World War II (Fort Leavenworth: 
School of Advanced Military Studies, 1988), 6. 
3 Robert W. Coakley, World War II: The War Against Japan (Office of the Chief of Military History, 
United States Army, 2001), 520. 
4 Thomas J. Culora, Japanese Operational Plans in World War II: Shortfalls in Critical Elements 
(Naval War College, 1994), 25. 
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resistance to change.5 Bix has written a biography of Hirohito6 that considers the ways in 
which his imperial upbringing influenced the way he thought, as well as how he 
influenced the Japanese decision-making process. Hirohito is portrayed as having much 
more influence in war planning than previous authors have claimed. 
Decision making is often addressed in the standard histories of the Pacific War,7 
but discussion often leaves out cultural or behavioral considerations, focusing more on 
personality and its interaction with structural pressures facing the Japanese government. 
Other studies have sought out other factors affecting decision making, including the 
influence of advisors8 or the rise of the army as a dominant political actor.9 Few studies 
so far have considered in detail the influence of intervening variables like culture or an 
operational code on decision making. 
 Chinese decision making at the Geneva Conference in 1954, on the other hand, 
has received less attention in the literature, probably due to the relative lack of primary 
source data when compared to the Japanese case. Unlike Japan, China has not opened all 
of its state archives to scholars interested in obtaining telegrams, minutes, journals, and 
the like. Past histories of Chinese involvement with the Indochina War have de-
emphasized its role at the Geneva Conference, or have considered its involvement from 
the perspective of another participating state, such as the United States or the United 
                                                 
5 Gordon, “The China-Japan War,” 152–3. 
6 Herbert P. Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan (New York: HarperCollinsPublishers, 
2000). 
7 Robert J.C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1961); 
John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire (New York: Random House, 
1970); Alan Schom, The Eagle and the Rising Sun: the Japanese-American War, 1941–1943 (New York: 
Norton, 2004).  
8 Lesley Connors, The Emperor’s Advisor: Saionji Kinmochi and Pre-War Japanese Politics (London: 
Nissan Institute for Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, 1987). 
9 Richard J. Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: The Army and the Rural 
Community (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974); Edward J. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army: 
Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009).  
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Kingdom.10 Elsewhere, discussion of Chinese diplomacy in this period is considered only 
in the context of interaction with another state, most often the United States.11 Many of 
these works emphasize the importance of Communist ideology driving Chinese decision 
making to support the Vietminh, but this is likely a reflection of the Cold War 
environment in which many of these were written. However, Zhai’s treatment of China’s 
involvement in Vietnam still considers ideology as important. 
 With respect to the conference specifically, Zhai has produced an assessment of 
Chinese involvement with the Indochina Conference based on newly released documents 
from the early 1990s.12 He describes in detail the relationship between the Chinese and 
the Vietminh prior to the conference on the basis of Chinese documents. He then offers a 
narrative history of the conference and Chinese involvement, focusing on the Chinese 
contribution to its settlement and motivations for Chinese action. He emphasizes the 
importance of Zhou Enlai and his relationship with the Politburo in negotiating a 
settlement. He then discusses how attendance at the conference influenced China’s 
relations with the other attendees. The paper produces the clearest depiction of Chinese 
involvement at the conference in the literature, but it does not consider the decision-
making process, which this thesis will attempt to do. It also needs to be updated to 
account for new documents that have been released. Finally, it does not evaluate the 
potential contributions of culture, organization, or operational code as intervening 
variables affecting behavior. None of the histories of China during this period adequately 
incorporate this level of analysis. 
                                                 
10 Melvin Gurtov, The first Vietnam Crisis: Chinese Communist strategy and the United States 
involvement, 1953–1954 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1967); Chae-Jin Lee, “Communist 
China and the Geneva Conference on Laos: A Reappraisal,” Asian Survey 9 (1969): 522–539; Robert F. 
Randle, Geneva 1954: The Settlement of the Indochinese War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1969); Qiang Zhai, China & the Vietnam Wars, 1950–1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2000).  
11 Harry Harding and Yuang Ming, eds., Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955: A Joint Reassessment 
of a Critical Decade (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1989); Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence 
and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1992); Nancy Bernkopf, ed., China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 
1945–1996 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2001); Robert S. Ross and Jiang Changbin, eds., 
Re-examining the Cold War: U.S. –China Diplomacy, 1954–1973 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Asia Center, 2002). 
12 Zhai Qiang, “China and the Geneva Conference of 1954,” The China Quarterly 129 (1992): 103–
122. 
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 To summarize the contributions to the literature so far, Japanese decision making 
prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War has been considered in detail, while Chinese 
decision making in relation to the 1954 Geneva Conference has been considered in less 
detail. Japanese decision making has been characterized to be irrational and dominated by 
bureaucratic infighting, although more recent work has shown the influence of the 
Emperor in a way that has not been shown before. Chinese decision making has been 
shown to be centralized around the Politburo and driven by personality and ideology. Past 
work has emphasized the importance of developing narrative histories of what happened, 
but they have not sought explanations involving culture, organizations, or operational 
code. This study seeks to add that level of complexity to fill gaps in both literatures. With 
respect to Japan, the gap lies in the lack of attention paid to the influence of these three 
variables on the decision-making process. With respect to China, the gap lies in a lack of 
an updated study that incorporates new documents and views decision making in the 
context of these variables. 
The need to add this level of complexity is clear. Recent psychological research13 
has shown that members of different cultural groups react to problems differently. The 
strategic culture literature, to some extent, captures this point of view. Its major 
contribution is to treat culture as an instrumental variable in determining state behavior, 
and this study will seek to apply it at the individual level through the study of national 
leaders. Johnston has developed a model of analysis for strategic culture14 that is useful 
for framing this discussion. 
D. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Assessing decision making in this way is a complex task. This job will be made 
easier with the inclusion of primary source material. In Japan, decision making prior to 
the war was conducted by Imperial Liaison conferences, which brought together 
members of the military with Cabinet ministers to develop policy and discuss issues. 
                                                 
13 Klein et al., “Cultural Differences in Cognition: Rosetta Phase I,” Psychological Reports 105 
(2009): 659–674. 
14 Alaistair Ian Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19 (1995): 32–64. 
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These conferences were the primary policy-making bodies in Japan at the time. After the 
Japanese defeat, various actors declassified, retrieved, and translated the records of these 
meetings, and they were published in a 1967 volume incorporating the records of 65 
conferences held in 1941, all before the declaration of war.15 Access to these records 
provides a wealth of data with which to analyze this case. 
Unlike Japan, China has never published transcripts of its meeting minutes in an 
easily accessible way. But some documents have still been made available to the general 
public and translated into English. The Cold War International History Project maintains 
an online archive of Chinese foreign policy documents, with a large section on the 1954 
Geneva Conference, which includes memorandums, telegrams, and minutes of meetings 
between various actors. These new documents should add value to the analysis of this 
case in a way not available to earlier researchers, and this study will rely heavily upon 
these communications in considering how the Chinese made decisions. These are 
essentially unmined in the scholarly literature.  Along with other secondary source data, 
the availability of primary sources for both of these cases is sufficient to begin to fill the 
gap in the research. In both cases, there is some uncertainty associated with the 
documents, as there is always ambiguity in translations. However, since both sets of 
documents were translated by native speakers this problem should be minimized. 
 The theory of strategic culture indicates that the decisions states make will be 
conditioned by their history, geography, and national culture. It predicts that each state 
has a unique decision-making culture that shapes the choices it is faced with and 
ultimately makes. It also predicts that this strategic culture is one of the most important 
things to consider when thinking about what a state will do in any given situation. 
Conventional wisdom suggests that this theory should hold; it is hard to imagine a 
situation where culture would not influence decision making. But this effect is difficult to 
quantify, and it is worth testing the strategic culture theory to understand not only 
whether it is accurate, but through what channels it operates. 
                                                 
15 Nobutaka Ike, Japan’s Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Palo Alto, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1967). 
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 It is also important to consider the debates within the strategic culture school and 
how strategic culture is received by other international relations scholars. This provides 
proper context for research design and the relationship between strategic culture and 
operational code. Within strategic culture there are three generations of research. The first 
generation focused on differences in historical experiences, geography, and political 
culture and how those yielded different nuclear strategies between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.16 The main challenge it faced was that it was sometime too broad: too 
many factors were considered to be inputs in strategic culture when all of the different 
inputs could be separate explanations of strategic choice. There was also the implication 
that strategic culture always led to consistent behavior, when in actuality thoughts and 
actions were often inconsistent with each other.17 
 The second generation of theory focused on how strategic culture could be used 
as a tool of political hegemony. Strategic culture is therefore used instrumentally by elites 
to justify operational strategy and to silence or mislead potential political challengers.18 
The key issue with this generation of research was that the relationship between culture 
and behavior was not clear, and that it is not clear whether we should expect the strategic 
discourse containing strategic culture to influence behavior.  
 The third generation uses strategic culture as an intervening variable to focus on 
particular strategic decisions as dependent variables. Different kinds of culture are used, 
such as military, political-military, or organizational. It excludes behavior as an element 
in an attempt to avoid “the tautological traps of the first generation.”19 It is explicitly 
committed to competitive theory testing.  
 Strategic culture as a concept is not without its critics. These critics challenge 
both the fundamental concept of strategic culture and the way the research is conducted. 
Desch argues that “the central problem with the new culturalism in security studies is that 
its theories, by themselves, do not provide much additional explanatory power beyond 
                                                 
16 Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” 36. 
17 Ibid., 37. 
18 Ibid., 37. 
19 Ibid., 41. 
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existing structural theories.”20 Put another way, there are ways for culture to supplement 
existing theories in international security by “explaining lags between structural changes 
and state behavior, accounting for deviant state behavior, and explaining behavior in 
structurally indeterminate environments.”21 
 Twomey notes that strategic culture theory has persuasive work on 
organizationally derived military culture, as well as for explanations of variation in 
national identity that depend on constructed, ideational sources. However, he argues that 
there is a middle ground between these two kinds of work—this middle group he calls a 
“core” that “takes national-level cultures and uses them to explain tendencies in national 
‘ways of war’ or grand strategies.”22 However, he argues, the literature is marred by 
overdetermined predictions, by explaining universal practices, and by politicized studies. 
 Glenn takes the optimistic view that there can be areas for strategic culture and 
neorealist theory to intersect. That is, strategic culture theory should not be cast aside as 
irrelevant, and that there are areas where much could be gained from examination of 
alternative explanations of state behavior. Glenn argues that two conceptions of strategic 
culture, epiphenomenal approaches that explain deviations of state behavior from general 
patterns predicted by neorealism and conventional constructivist conceptions, could have 
meaningful collaboration with neorealism.23 
 There are two common threads in this literature. First there is a concern over the 
question of how culture relates to other theories of international relations. The second is 
more relevant to this thesis, which is the extent to which it is possible to think of culture 
as a factor in influencing behavior—what kind of behavior, through what channels, and 
how great of an effect? To consider Japanese and Chinese decision making, this thesis 
will try to overcome these methodological challenges through a blending of strategic 
culture and operational code analysis. 
                                                 
20 Michael C. Desch, “Culture versus Structure in Post-9/11 Security Studies,” Strategic Insights 4 
(2005): 2. 
21 Desch, “Culture versus Structure in Post-9/11 Security Studies,” 6. 
22 Christopher P. Twomey, “Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security,” Contemporary 
Security Policy 29 (2008): 338–9. 
23 John Glenn, “Realism versus Strategic Culture: Competition and Collaboration,” International 
Studies Review 11 (2009): 530. 
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 For strategic culture analysis, this thesis will loosely follow the general research 
design proposed by Johnston to avoid the methodological pitfalls he identifies in existing 
strategic culture work.24 It is first necessary to identify culture-based factors that 
influence assumptions held by decision-makers. This means it is necessary to discern the 
central elements of a strategic culture by conducting research on history and shared 
perceptions. With an identified strategic culture in hand, it is then necessary to evaluate 
its links to behavior by testing for its presence in policy documents and in the minds of 
decision-makers. It will be necessary to attempt to control of non-cultural variables, 
which will be a challenge. This thesis will conceptualize the relationship between 
strategic culture and decision making as a filter; strategic culture allows a decision-maker 
facing a choice opportunity to view the world and his options for dealing with a problem 
in a certain way.  
Against this theory, this thesis will also lay out the argument of a more general 
theory of offensive realism, developed by John Mearsheimer.25 Realism posits that state 
behavior is driven by a desire to accumulate power to survive in an anarchic international 
system. Offensive realism goes on to suggest that states will seize power from other 
states to make themselves more secure. In Chapter Two, this thesis describes elements of 
offensive realism in how they pertain to the actions of Japan and China during the periods 
under analysis. In effect, it will suggest alternative courses of action for both cases 
supported by realist theory. There is value in this: realism goes a long way in explaining 
state behavior, and it has been alleged that strategic culture theory adds little to academic 
discussion that is not already explained by realism. 
Another way think about decision making is through the operational code model 
of analysis. Developed by Nathan Leites, operational code analysis is an attempt to 
identify shared response repertoires, decision-making rules, and the spirit of a ruling 
group.26 Due to its complexity, it has sometimes been neglected by analysts when 
                                                 
24 Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” 52–4. 
25 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 
2001). 
26 Stephen G. Walker, “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis,” Political Psychology 11 (1990): 
404. 
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studying decision making despite its utility.27 This thesis will take elements from 
operational code analysis in assessing decision making to understand its utility and the 
basic characteristics of a Japanese and Chinese operational code. Walker has compiled a 
list of “philosophical” and “instrumental” questions to help determine “boundaries” for 
decision making that are influenced by an operational code.28 These questions and 
Walker’s overview of how to conduct operational code analysis will be instrumental in 
identifying the elements of the codes. The operational code should differ in the two cases 
because of the different ideologies underpinning their political systems, and this should 
affect decision making differently in both cases. 
This thesis will begin with individual application of these lenses to each case. It 
will consider what these different methods of analysis say about the individual cases, and 
it will then consider how they are complementary. Strategic culture and operational code 
have the same foundational idea—to consider the habits and mindset of a ruling group 
typically bound by a common culture or belief system. However, the ways those belief 
systems are manifested differ depending on the lens of analysis used. This thesis will 
consider the extent to which strategic culture and operational code could be 
complementary—is strategic culture analysis supported by findings of operational code 
analysis and vice-versa? The relationship between these two lenses could illuminate some 
aspects about decision making and how to conduct decision-making research.   
E. ROADMAP 
This thesis will be organized as follows. In Chapter II, strategic culture will be 
applied to the Japanese and Chinese cases and the results will be assessed. In Chapter III, 
operational code analysis will be applied to the cases and the results assessed. In Chapter 
IV, the results the analysis will be analyzed together, as will the extent to which the 
theories are complementary. Chapter V will conclude this thesis with an analysis of its 
contributions and possibilities for future research. 
                                                 
27 Alexander L. George, “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political 
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II. STRATEGIC CULTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers the influence of culture as it is manifest in Japan and 
China’s strategic culture. The idea of culture in influencing international relations is often 
discussed in international relations literature. For example, Rosen has written on the 
influence of social structures in how societies generate military power.29  Julienne has 
also written on the limitations of applying western frameworks, such as realism, to 
analyze structures developed in societies that are very different, signaling a need for a 
cultural approach.30 The theory of strategic culture proposes that the decisions states 
make will be conditioned by their history, geography, and national culture. It suggests 
that each state has a unique decision-making culture that shapes the choices it is faced 
with, and ultimately makes. It also suggests that this strategic culture is one of the most 
important things to consider when thinking about what a state will do in any given 
situation. This paper will test the theory of strategic culture under this definition, and 
specifically, the first generation of the theory.  
Many authors31 have written on the influence of a national decision-making 
culture on a state’s choices. The first generation of strategic culture theory argues that 
differences in the way national leaders think about strategy were caused by variations in 
three levels of analysis: macroenvironmental variables such as geography, ethnocultural 
characteristics, and history; societal variables like social, economic, and political 
structures of a society; and micro-level variables consisting of military institutions and 
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characteristics of civil-military relations.32 It suggests that there are dominant national 
beliefs that produce peculiarly national approaches to strategy. There are two further 
generations of the theory that emphasize strategic culture’s utility as a tool of political 
hegemony and considering organizational culture as an intervening variable, but the first 
generation is the simplest, “classic” theory.  
 This chapter proceeds as follows. Indications for behavior stemming from 
strategic culture in both cases are presented. Evidence for strategic culture is then 
presented for both cases. An analysis of the validity of strategic culture theory in both 
cases then follows, as well as comparisons of how decision making differs in both cases.  
B.  HYPOTHESES 
To conduct strategic culture analysis, it is necessary to develop hypotheses about 
how strategic culture will be manifested in behavior. To that end, it is easiest to do that 
by developing predictions about behavior, which this section will do for both cases. 
These predictions rely heavily on assessments of Japanese and Chinese culture made by 
experts writing about the periods in question, so as to not cloud the analysis with personal 
biases. 
1. Japan 
 For the Japanese case, there are three key elements of Japanese strategic culture 
that this thesis will emphasize. First, elements of conservatism that led to reticence, 
unwillingness to accept negative data, and a general lack of innovation and strong sense 
of risk aversion. Second, a culture of militarism that favored military solutions to 
problems over other solutions. Third, a culture of deference that could compound 
militaristic tendencies. 
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 Several authors33 have considered Japanese strategic culture during the Pacific 
War period. Ford claims that Japanese Army culture was imbued with a “conservatism 
that hindered any significant transformation, even when wartime experiences proved 
beyond a doubt that its ways were not adequate,” and describes general strategic culture 
as stagnant and insistent upon an adherence to set beliefs and practices.34 Because of this, 
Japanese leaders did not scrutinize their situation carefully or in an objective manner, and 
misconceptions of the enemy led the Japanese on a course toward defeat. In the 
transcripts, this would lead to reticence to act and unwillingness to accept negative data. 
In fact, there is evidence that later in the war poor statistics, fraud from military 
contractors, and a growing black market made enforcement of quotas “virtually 
impossible, as most members of the Planning Board admitted after the war.”35 This is 
consistent with the idea that conservatism would lead to stagnation, which would enable 
all of the above to occur. 
 Another characteristic of prewar Japanese thinking was militarism. In this sense, 
militarism meant that Japanese leadership was convinced that military solutions were the 
default options for engagement with the international community. While leaders would 
pursue cooperation and peace, they only do so when they are unclear whether military 
action would work. Militarists would choose military action exclusively and resort to 
cooperation strategies when forced to do so. Planning revolved around how military 
actions should succeed, and planning for how to engage in diplomatic activities was 
conducted on the fly.  
 It is not unreasonable to think that rational leaders would take a balanced 
approached and sometimes plan for military action and sometimes plan for cooperation, 
depending on the circumstances and what they expect to work. This is contested in the 
academic literature, with classic studies arguing that military dictatorships are actually 
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less war prone than non-dictatorships.36 Recent research, however, contends this 
hypothesis, with quantitative analysis showing that states with strong civilian control of 
the military because civilian leaders can punish the military for misadventures.37 In this 
case, this thesis proposes that Japanese leaders would always plan for military action and 
prefer it over anything else.   
Smethurst has commented on how the extent to which militaristic thinking was 
imbued in the Japanese populace through a strong reservist association and military 
education.38 Militarism became a part of the fabric of Japanese society, leading to a 
culture favoring aggressive expansion and Japanese expeditions abroad. Japanese leaders 
would have viewed Japan expanding by force as the state of nature; it would have been 
unusual for Japan to not wish to expand. For example, Toland notes that “military 
leaders…could almost always override the civilians; their resignation would bring the 
government down…Military monopoly had become a tradition and was rarely 
questioned.”39  
 It is important to observe that militarism of this kind does not necessarily arise 
because of military control. A military dictatorship naturally creates conditions where the 
military position and solutions have precedence over civilian leadership. By that basic 
definition, any military dictatorship will show militaristic tendencies, and the Japanese 
case is no exception. This does not mean they are more likely to declare war, but that 
they are more likely to show tendencies for hostility as a means of resolution to conflict 
and to suggest it more in discussions about key issues. This thesis additionally argues that 
militarism in this case is transmitted culturally, permeating through all levels of society, 
and supported by not just the military. It was not just the military or military-controlled 
leaders who drove Japan to war –the civilian apparatus that fed them information, the 
education apparatus that taught Japanese militarism from a young age, the civilian leaders 
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attending Liaison Conferences and Cabinet meetings, and the Emperor and his entourage 
all supported militarism. Whether or not this was caused by the military being in power is 
important, but the ultimate point is that militarism had its roots in and was perpetuated by 
elements of a national culture that was manifest at all levels.  
 Schom argues that “Japan’s senior war leaders were neither realistic enough, nor 
sufficiently open-minded, and in consequence were intent on blind military adventurism, 
confident in the superiority of their genius.”40 He poses a few basic questions that are 
obvious in hindsight, but that Japanese leaders did not ask when planning for war, such as 
where to find officers to fill a manpower shortage and where to source various resources 
and spare parts. A combination of a conservatism that led to unwillingness to ask the 
right questions and a push for military activity seem to have existed and it is right to 
explore their manifestation.   
We should also see a strong tendency toward unity in general, and particularly 
after decisions were made. There would be deference toward superiors and a general lack 
of difficult questions to superiors. This includes the Emperor, as every person in Japan 
should consider him as a fatherlike and divine figure. Bix’s biography of Hirohito 
demonstrates this well. Hirohito’s grandfather, Emperor Meiji, “was propagandized as 
the very touchstone of all virtue.”41  This could lead to decisions being made on the basis 
of personality, not data, as underlings respect the men they work for more than the 
positions they hold. This submissiveness is related to, as Smethurst notes, the idea of 
sacrificing for the “good of the nation.”42 Individual interests would be subordinated to 
the interests of the group, and challenges to unity would be morally wrong.  
While nationalism and authoritarianism could have been factors in driving this, 
there is evidence that it was something that Japanese leaders simply felt was right. For 
example, in January 1938 when the Cabinet had decided to expand military operations in 
China, an Army Vice-Chief of Staff Tada Hayao opposed the ruling of the Cabinet and 
argued strenuously against the policy. He even sought a meeting with the Emperor, which 
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was denied. Navy Minister Yonai Mitsumasa even suggested that “if Tada could not 
agree with cabinet policy as sanctioned by the Emperor, his resignation was in order.”43 
Tada eventually was forced to relent and give his official sanction to the planned 
operations.  
2. China 
For the Chinese case, I will focus on two areas where Chinese culture should have 
influenced decision making: perceptions of national security interests and perceptions of 
foreigners. By way of background, it can generally be said that China was a country that 
in 1954 had suffered centuries of invasions by foreign aggressors, was a land power for 
much of its history, had a long tradition of strategic and military thought, and had a 
government characterized by nationalistic and ideological thinking.44 Zhang has written 
about Chinese strategic culture during this period, and the following borrows from his 
work. 
 China’s national security interests in 1954 were characterized by an irrational 
insistence on border security and national autonomy, and particularly the threat of foreign 
invasion and control over China. Every state experiences this to some extent, but most 
have this reaction to a actual  threat. For example, Poland’s experiences with Germany 
and Russia would have led the Polish government to revolve planning around those 
countries. The French construction of the Maginot Line during the interwar period was a 
clear reaction to perceived German aggression. For the Chinese case, there was no 
specific threat during this period beyond the United States and its proxies, leading it to be 
specifically concerned about them in relation to its borders. A realist perspective would 
generate a view of the world that takes challenger power into account, not an irrational 
view of power that inflates their capabilities and intentions. Chinese leaders were 
strongly concerned about U.S. intentions toward it even when the capability did not exist. 
This fear was probably driven by a view of history through a lens of ideology and culture. 
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According to Zhang, “China’s status as a land power, its bitter experience of 
foreign intervention, and its traditional self-image of being at the center of the universe 
dictate that the Chinese defense establishment would focus on physical survival and 
national autonomy.”45 The influence of foreign invasion seemed to be strong, and 
China’s national sovereignty was a major concern for decision-makers. This would have 
led to concern about possible foreign expansion near China, including the establishment 
of military bases or the stationing of troops nearby. In terms of international discussions, 
Chinese leaders would have emphasized threats, real or imagined, in their dealings with 
other participants at Geneva, interpreting any desire to station foreign military forces 
nearby as a possible threat. In their conversations with other states, they would have been 
reluctant to open up Chinese borders or allow foreigners access to Chinese soldiers. 
 This is related to Chinese perceptions of foreigners. During this period, the 
Chinese regarded “foreign barbarians” as untrustworthy. On the basis of their dealings 
with Americans, CCP leaders did not believe they could trust the “Meiguolao” (American 
devils), claiming that Marshall had cheated them in mediation in 1946 and that Truman 
had lied on Taiwan in early 1950.46 For Chinese leaders, the United States was another in 
a long line of imperial powers who sought to dominate Asia and China. This xenophobia 
would have led to general distrust of foreign intentions at Geneva. In internal discussions, 
Chinese leaders would have referenced their distrust of foreign intentions and would have 
been reluctant to agree to proposals without firm evidence that it would not harm China. 
In discussions with other participants, Chinese leaders would have been cautious and 
calculated with what information they agreed to share and the extent to which they would 
agree to multilateral action. 
3. Realism as a Baseline 
What would a baseline for these cases look like? That is, what is the typical 
behavior that should be expected of these governments in the absence of cultural factors 
like these? The theory of offensive realism presumes that the international system exists 
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in a state of anarchy and that in order for states to survive in such a system, they must 
maximize their share of world power. This should serve as a hedge against other states 
that may have some offensive intention that is difficult to see. Sometimes, maximizing 
power means going to war against another state. Mearsheimer shows that in unbalanced 
multipolar systems, like the world Japan existed in in 1941, war is much more likely due 
to greater potential for conflict situation and disparity of great-minor power dyads.47 The 
same is true for the strategic situation facing the Chinese government in 1954. 
As discussed in Chapter I, offensive realism will be used as a baseline measure of 
behavior for both the Japanese and Chinese cases. The world it describes seems to fit 
those of the cases, and it describes basic behavior concerning rational actors. In this 
world, both Chinese and Japanese leaders would pursue power maximization strategies 
because of insecurity they feel in the international system. Both states would pursue 
strategies like offensive military action, alliance building, or coercive diplomacy in an 
effort to ensure their survival and continued security. However, both of these states were 
also relatively weak actors in the international community; China was still reeling from 
the effects of its decade of war, and Japan was stretched militarily and suffered from 
critical resource shortages and a lack of manufacturing capability. A rational actor in that 
position would have sought strong allies and would probably have avoided conflict 
strategies due to relative military weakness. However, Mearsheimer does note that in the 
case of multipolarity states are more likely to “underestimate the resolve of rival states 
and the strength of opposing coalitions,” which could explain deviations from this 
rational position.48 
C. CASE STUDY: JAPAN 
There is some evidence from the transcripts that Japanese decision making 
exhibited some elements of strategic culture. Several of the meetings concerned 
nonsubstantive matters, so five of the 57 transcripts were unsuitable for analysis. Of the 
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remainder, 78% of the documents contained evidence for conservatism impeding 
decision making. Sixty-eight percent demonstrated evidence for conflict strategies being 
advocated over cooperation strategies. Thirty-two percent demonstrated evidence for the 
idea of unity playing a role in discussions. In this section, I discuss some relevant 
excerpts from the documents that demonstrate the type of evidence in them and then 
assess possible reasons for the relative proportion of evidence in the sample. 
Liaison Conferences in late June demonstrated Japanese militarism. At the 
Liaison Conferences of 25 June–1 July 1941, prior to the important Imperial Conference 
of 2 July, the government and military considered policies about military operations in 
French Indochina. These conferences also had the objective of dealing with the 
possibility of war with the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Matsuoka repeatedly argued 
for war with the Soviet Union, stating on 25 June that “when Germany wins and disposes 
of the Soviet Union, we can’t take the fruits of victory without having done something. 
We have to either shed blood or engage in diplomacy. It’s best to shed blood.”49 Realist 
thinking would lead to a balanced approach that probably would not advocate shedding 
blood above diplomacy.  
Other ministers argued for war as well. At an Imperial Conference on 2 July 1941, 
in front of the Emperor, President of the Privy Council Hara Takashi made the following 
point: 
Some people say that it would be improper for Japan to attack the Soviet 
Union in view of the Neutrality Pact; but the Soviet Union is notorious for 
her habitual acts of betrayal. If we were to attack the Soviet Union, no one 
would regard it as treachery. I am eagerly waiting for the opportunity to 
attack the Soviet Union.50 
 
Hara’s desire for quick military action against the Soviet Union was supported by other 
attendees at the conference, despite the fact that Japan was actively prosecuting a war in 
China and planning for military operations against the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom, while simultaneously preparing for war with the United States. This is less an 
issue of miscalculation and related more to principles; Hara’s reference to habitual 
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betrayals and treachery shows that there is a moral or ideological component to his 
argument. This demonstrates a strong influence of militarism in Japanese leadership. 
While all of these problems could have been resolved through other means, military 
action was always favored. This is underscored by the fact that the Foreign Minister was 
the biggest supporter of war even while he “pursued” peace talks with the Soviet Union 
and the United States. In Japan’s situation at the time, a realist position probably would 
not have advocated for war so strongly given resource constraints and the strength of the 
enemy. 
General conservatism was also shown. War Minister Tojo on 29 May 1941 
reported that it would be necessary for the government to exercise greater control over 
the expression of opinions that criticize the government. Foreign Minister Matsuoka 
agreed, noting that “Yesterday the newspaper Hochi printed a statement by Muto Teiichi 
saying that the United States should enter the war in alliance with Japan. I do not think 
such remarks are appropriate.”51  Minister of Home Affairs Hiranuma noted that “a 
certain person of fairly high status visited my house and remarked, ‘It is outrageous that 
Wang Ching-Wei should be coming to Japan in June,’ a statement contrary to the view of 
the Government. It is not appropriate to express opinions that run counter to measures 
taken by the Government.”52 As no solutions were available to deal with this matter, the 
participants stopped discussion and put it off for a later date. This episode also shows a 
reference to the idea of unity referenced in the introduction. Japanese leaders expected 
that the Japanese people, particularly those of high status that could be politically 
influential, would think the same way.  
An inability to confront adverse data was a common problem as the summer went 
on. A continuing problem decision-makers faced was a lack of resources with which to 
conduct war. At a meeting on 1 July 1941, there was discussion about preparations for a 
possible war with the Soviet Union. Minister of Commerce and Industry Kobayashi 
stated bluntly “I do not think we have sufficient strength, so far as resources are 
concerned, to support a war. Both the Army and Navy can resort to force, but we do not 
                                                 
51 Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 45. 
52 Ike, Japan’s Decision for War, 45.  
 23 
have materials for war on both land and sea.”53 Did the other participants make any note 
of this discussion, which could have led to any campaign grinding to a halt? There was 
no vetting or response to this information in a way like Schom suggested, asking basic 
questions about sustainability or operational planning. Rather, Army Vice Chief of Staff 
Tsukada Ko remarked almost immediately after: “The Foreign Minister’s drafts of the 
message to Germany and his statement to the Imperial Conference are well done, aren’t 
they?” to which Matusoka responded, “It turned out well because I listened to the 
opinions of all of you.”54 Without a way to deal with this problem, the participants 
resorted to flippant remarks and small-talk on the eve of a major conference. A realist 
approach, which emphasizes rationality, would have allowed for the consideration of 
these problems in relation to how they would affect the outcome of operations and 
thereby the probability of Japanese success. 
 An interesting aspect of the meeting that is not captured by the official transcripts 
comes from Toland, who notes that when the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 
pressed military leaders on whether diplomacy would be a real option, they were unable 
to answer. At the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, Emperor Hirohito, who had 
remained silent and a passive observer in such meetings for years, directly asked the 
military leadership why they were unable to respond, and then rebuked them for their 
silence, then reading a poem about peace written by his grandfather. As Toland notes, 
“the listeners sat awed by the Emperor’s censure.”55 But this rebuke, while embarrassing, 
did nothing to change the actual course of decision making.  
This episode demonstrates an element of strategic culture related to deference and 
unity. Toland describes Nagano and Sugiyama, the military chiefs, sitting paralyzed until 
Nagano “forced himself to stand up…humbly, head bowed.”56 He apparently floundered 
in his apology to the Emperor, and he and Sugiyama quickly made an apology and 
reiterated their desire for peace. While the Emperor held titular power as head of 
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government, in practice it was the military chief and the civilian ministers who controlled 
actual operations. Cultural factors could explain why Nagano and Sugiyama cared 
enough about the Emperor’s opinion to go so far as to make an apology—and be afraid 
while doing so. In the end, the Emperor was convinced to accede to military action based 
on respectful lobbying by Tojo, military advisors, and members of the Privy Council. In a 
delicate political move, the Liaison Conference attendees respected the integrity of 
authority and unity of government while still pushing a militaristic agenda. 
 In summary, Japanese leaders during this period could have pursued a strategy 
that maximized power in a way that would not lead to their ultimate destruction. They 
could have pursued a limited cooperation strategy and even some conflict strategies when 
accounting for miscalculation. But a push for unity, a lack of dissension, and militaristic 
tendencies were factors that pushed the Japanese government on a path toward war. 
D.  CASE STUDY: CHINA 
The archive displays an appreciable amount of evidence that strategic culture 
mattered for Chinese decision making at the Geneva Conference in 1954. It is first 
important to note that some of the documents were not suitable for this analysis, as they 
were routine telegrams or notes about the movement of Chinese leaders between cities, or 
they discussed things other than policy. There were 16 documents in this category, 
leaving 64 documents to analyze. Of the remainder, 40% of the documents contained 
evidence for a uniquely Chinese perception of national security interests. Half 
demonstrated evidence for Chinese distrust of foreigners, particularly the United States. 
In total, 55%, or 35 of 64 documents, demonstrate one of these two elements of strategic 
culture. In this section, I discuss some relevant excerpts from the documents that 
demonstrate the type of evidence in them and then assess possible reasons for the relative 
proportion of evidence in the sample. 
 The hypothesis for Chinese perception of national security interests stated that 
Chinese decision-makers would be unusually concerned about anything that could 
potentially threaten Chinese sovereignty or its borders. While this thinking is in line with 
realism theory, it differs in that in the Chinese example, the Chinese should not 
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demonstrate a desire to take offensive military action to secure borders, or to build a large 
military to secure them. Chinese strategic culture would call for negotiations but 
relatively little cooperation, as ideological differences and mistrust would preclude any 
sustainable agreements with foreigners. Therefore, Chinese leaders would be concerned 
about the presence of weapons and soldiers near borders and emphasize those points in 
negotiations repeatedly while shying away from strong desires to politically influence 
any of the actors or project power. This is shown in the evidence. For example, in 
Document #4, a draft policy memorandum prepared for the delegation, the Chinese 
officials resolved: 
That from the day of the armistice, no combat plane, armored vehicle, 
weapons or ammunition, other military materials, or any armed force and 
military personnel should be allowed to enter Indochina…Within six 
months after the armistice, all foreign navy, ground force and air force, 
and military personnel should complete withdrawal from Indochina.57 
It becomes clear again and again that one of the main Chinese policy goals at the meeting 
is to prevent a foreign military influence in Indochina, so close to Chinese borders. Zhou 
met later with Richard Casey, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, as recorded in 
Document #40. When Casey mentioned that other countries could fear China establishing 
bases in Indochina, Zhou responded: 
Foreign Minister Zhou asked: Did you mean that if China establishes 
military bases in Indochina? How could China go to Indochina and 
establish military bases there? We believe that no foreign countries should 
establish military bases in Indochina. 
It is therefore clear that Chinese leaders were deeply concerned about foreign influence in 
Indochina, near the Chinese border, but that they did not have designs on taking the 
territory for themselves. Were they really concerned that bases would be used to violate 
Chinese sovereignty? Later in Zhou’s conversation with Casey, he noted: 
Foreign Minister Zhou said, it will be difficult for us to imagine that 
Australia would go and establish military bases everywhere alone if the 
                                                 
57 All quotes taken from the original documents. For full texts of these documents, please refer to 
Chen Jian and Shen Zuihua, “The Geneva Conference of 1954: New Evidence from the Archives of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,” Cold War International History Project 
Bulletin 16 (2008): 7–84.  
 26 
United States had not established military bases in the western Pacific 
Ocean and all over Asia. We believe that only the military bases 
established in our own countries can be called defensive ones. Military 
bases established in other countries’ territories are for aggressive reasons. 
This is our definition. 
This is consistent with the idea that Chinese leaders were influenced by their history of 
invasions and foreign aggression. When Japanese military bases were established in 
Shanghai and northern China in the 1930s, it gave the Japanese military the foothold it 
needed to launch a full-scale invasion. Foreign military involvement in Indochina was 
important from a security perspective, but also from an ideological perspective. The 
strategic culture of China demanded that decision-makers consider the placement of 
foreign soldiers in Indochina not just as a security dilemma, but as a risk to Chinese 
power in Asia. This is consistent with a realist viewpoint of the world. 
 The evidence is similar for Chinese distrust of foreigners. The hypothesis was that 
due to China’s history of domination by foreign powers, particularly during World War 
II, Chinese leaders would be more likely to demonstrate a natural distrust of foreign 
powers. 50% of the documents demonstrated evidence that Chinese leaders thought in 
this way.  For example, in Document #8, a telegram from Zhou Enlai to Mao and the 
Central Committee describing a conversation with British Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden, Zhou noted: 
We also asked what subjects would be specifically discussed in the 
restricted session. However, Eden did not answer this question. It is the 
British and Americans who are taking the initiative and sounding us out, 
and we should not react too positively except to agree to hold the meeting. 
Here we see the natural cautiousness in play. Zhou was unwilling to show too much of 
his feelings to Eden and the western delegations, as it could have opened up an angle for 
them to attack the Chinese delegation later. Instead, he was cautious and deliberate in the 
information he took from Eden and what he gave back. Later in his telegram, Zhou noted 
what was really driving his concern: 
Although the United States fired many blanks on the Indochina issue, they 
could not scare anyone but themselves. The United States is attempting to 
form an alliance of invaders of Southeast Asia. 
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This mistrust of the United States, driven by a fear of military intervention that could lead 
to imperialism, drove much of the Chinese reticence to deal with the Americans. Zhou’s 
fear of the Americans threatening Asia was also demonstrated in his belief that the 
Americans were trying to sabotage conference proceedings. Toward the end of the 
conference, there was substantive disagreement about issues related to Korea and talks 
threatened to break down. In a telegram recorded in Document #29 to Mao and the 
Central Committee, Zhou vents his frustration at American arrogance: 
The United States intended to sabotage the negotiations on the Korean 
issue. However, other countries did not agree. Obviously, it is the United 
States that intentionally creates tension both inside and outside the 
conference. The Americans are trying to win support under the signboard 
of the United Nations. They are afraid that our side will undermine the 
United Nations’ prestige, and that we will desperately oppose the exercise 
of veto over the issue of neutral nations. They are afraid that an 
organization of neutral nations on a footing of equality with both sides will 
be unfavorable to the United States. 
 
These concerns over the United States ruled much of Zhou’s thinking and communication 
to Beijing after the main segment of the conference ended. He began to strategize on how 
to defeat the Americans, who represented the latest imperialist threat, with their support 
of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. His strategy involved the following, recorded in 
Document #37: 
Even if we cannot prevent the conference from being sabotaged, we can at 
least drive our counterparts into an unfavorable position. The more modest 
our proposals are, the more passive our counterparts will be. It will also 
make it more difficult and more unreasonable of them to sabotage the 
conference.   
By continuing to be outwardly cautious toward the other powers, it would be possible for 
the Chinese delegation to achieve its goals without having to give in to the United States 
and the west, and it would expose the United States as the imperialist power that it was. 
All of the above quotes are consistent with the idea that Chinese decision making was 
influenced to an extent by its past historical experiences with foreign occupiers. This 
manifested in a distrust of most foreign powers, but an especially strong distrust of the 
United States, which Chinese leaders viewed as the newest power to try to dominate 
Asia.   
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 While this all shows evidence for strategic culture in Chinese decision making, it 
is actually unclear whether Chinese behavior truly differed from a more traditional 
conception of realist behavior. Put another way, almost all of the episodes described here, 
as well as most of the quotes from the documents exhibit strong tendencies toward 
realism as described as Mearsheimer. The elements of strategic culture above are 
manifest in the evidence, but these elements could also all be considered realist behavior. 
That is, while there are good reasons from a cultural-historical perspective for Chinese 
behavior to be like this, it is difficult to distinguish it from realist behavior. 
E. ANALYSIS 
In the Japanese case, all three traits of strategic culture are demonstrated in the 
evidence. 78% of the documents contained evidence for conservatism impeding decision 
making, 68% demonstrated evidence for conflict strategies being advocated over 
cooperation strategies, and 32% demonstrated evidence for the idea of unity playing a 
role in discussions. Japanese leaders during this period could have pursued a strategy that 
maximized power in a way that would not lead to their ultimate destruction. They could 
have pursued a limited cooperation strategy and even some conflict strategies when 
accounting for miscalculation. But a push for unity, a lack of dissension, and militaristic 
tendencies that surpass even the militarism of a “normal” military dictatorship were 
factors that pushed the Japanese government on a path toward war. 
 For the Chinese case, the data are mixed. To review, 40% of the documents 
contained evidence for a uniquely Chinese perception of national security interests and 
50% demonstrated evidence for Chinese distrust of foreigners. On the basis of the raw 
numbers, it seems that strategic culture could be an influence on decision making, but 
that realism could play just as large a role or that the effects are muddled. It is important 
to consider the validity of the proportions in assessing the validity of the argument. There 
are several reasons why these proportions could be incorrect. The researcher may have 
approached the documents with a bias that would lean toward strategic culture at the 
expense of realism, meaning that realism would be underrepresented. This is possible, as 
is any subjective system of “measuring” influence. 
 29 
 It is interesting to see how strategic culture compares in both cases. Both cases 
involve government leaders making strategic choices to counter the interests of western 
powers. In the Japanese case, the government was planning military operations abroad, 
while in the Chinese case the government was dealing with the ramifications of them. 
The similarity they share is in the extent to which a central group of leaders is able to 
make major decisions that influence overall foreign policy; centralized decision making 
allows for strategic culture to be particularly influential. The effect of strategic culture on 
an individual can also be identified in both cases, with Matsuoka heavily influenced by 
militaristic thinking and Zhou influenced by the ideology of liberation. Strategic culture 
seems to operate in similar channels.  
What does it mean for strategic culture to be exhibited in the evidence? It does not 
mean that strategic culture was the overriding factor in decision making. Put another way, 
the presence of strategic culture should not have a major effect on other reasons for why 
leaders thought in different ways. In both cases, leaders pursued goals that would lead to 
increases in national power or security. This is in line with realist thinking. But strategic 
culture served as a lens that helped leaders narrow their options for any choice 
opportunity. Japanese militarism led Japanese leaders to pursue security through force 
and surprise, while Chinese distrust of foreigners led them to reject any foreign 
intervention or influence in Indochina. There were many others options that could have 
been taken in either of these situations, and leaders pursued the ones that were chosen in 
part due to cultural influences.  
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III.  OPERATIONAL CODE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Another framework of analyzing the foreign policy behavior of decision-makers 
is operational code analysis, pioneered by Nathan Leites in his studies of Soviet decision 
making during the Cold War. In his major work on Soviet behavior, The Operational 
Code of the Politburo, Leites explored the system of rules that govern decision making, 
creating an operational code for Soviet leaders that characterized their worldview and 
perceptions.58 Subsequent work has taken and extended the operational code construct to 
apply to decision making of actors as diverse as Bill Clinton and Shimon Peres, despite 
acknowledgement that operational code analysis has been underutilized. Methodological 
work has focused on refining the means by which researchers can assess a particular 
leader’s operational code, as it has been noted that Leites’ original method may have 
been underused because of its difficulty.59 Leites surveyed hundreds of documents and 
noted by hand important characteristics of an operational code, a task that many 
researchers are not willing to take on. 
In his 1969 review of operational code research, Alexander George characterized 
operational code analysis as assessing political strategy in the rules of conduct and norms 
of behavior taken by leaders; in effect, identifying the spirit of a ruling class.60 George 
identified a number of fundamental beliefs held by a ruling class, organizing them as 
answers to sets of questions about philosophical and instrumental beliefs, with the former 
referring to assumptions about the fundamental nature of politics and the latter focusing 
                                                 
58 Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1951). 
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60 George, “The Operational Code,” 194. 
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on ends-means relationships in the context of political action.61 Consistent with the 
bounded rationality model for decision making, the answers to these questions represent 
the boundaries within which leaders make decisions, guides to refer to when seeking 
direction amidst uncertainty. Operational code research has been used the most with 
individual leaders. Although Leites’ original work considered the Politburo as a body, 
most of the work that followed him considers the speeches or writings of a single 
historical figure.  
B. OPERATIONAL CODE AND STRATEGIC CULTURE IN COMPARISON 
Operational code bears some similarities to strategic culture. Both methods 
consider the propensities of national leaders to be influenced in certain ways by a 
prevailing set of norms. The way in which these norms influence decision making differs 
between OC and SC. In operational code the influence is cognitive and is transmitted 
directly to decision making through a set of rules. In strategic culture the means differ, 
and due to the segmentation of the field into several schools of thought there is no 
consensus on the means by which strategic culture will influence decision making at 
different levels. The approach taken in the previous chapter was to take a more cognitive 
viewpoint and view strategic culture as filters that change how leaders think and operate, 
thereby changing behavior. 
 The advantage of operational code, when viewed in this way, is that it is relatively 
simpler and the literature is consistent on how operational code analysis should be 
conducted and used. Strategic culture literature has continual debates over 
methodological validity and whether the theory actually adds anything to the study of 
international relations. Its analytical power is less, however, than the potential of strategic 
culture. Strategic culture could potentially not only explain why leaders and states took 
certain actions, but could also predict the outcomes of future interactions on the basis of a 
consistent strategic culture. Compared to this, operational code is more descriptive and 
emphasizes the study of past leaders’ operational codes with an eye at influencing 
research on contemporary leaders. It is useful in analyzing the influence of events on 
                                                 
61 Walker, “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis,” 405. 
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leaders’ perception, but its predictive power as a theory is much less robust than strategic 
culture. Surprisingly, there is little mention of the other theory in either of these bodies of 
literature. 
   With this in mind, the discussion of operational code in this chapter will be 
framed as a comparison to the results of the strategic culture analysis of last chapter. The 
discussion in this chapter, which will be elaborated in the following chapter, will consider 
how the research results are the same or different, effectively using operational code as 
an analytical baseline with which to compare strategic culture results. This should not 
imply that operational code is closer to reality than strategic culture, but that strategic 
culture is more prone to poor research design or bias. With a random data sample and a 
consistent methodology, operational code analysis should avoid those problems and it 
should be possible to use operational code methodology to assess broader strategic 
culture arguments.  
C. CONDUCTIONG OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS 
The value of conducting operational code analysis versus strategic culture 
analysis is in the way that data is analyzed. While Leites accomplished this with 
painstaking manual analysis, modern operational code analysis relies on software 
packages that analyze speeches and documents of foreign leaders. The most widely used 
method is the Verbs-in-Context System (VICS) introduced by Walker et. al in their 1998 
article assessing Jimmy Carter’s operational code. 62 VICS has been characterized as a 
coding scheme that is “reliable and reproducible,” and adheres to a theoretical conception 
that allows for “incoherence among beliefs…variation across individuals, learning 
(defined as change in beliefs) over time by a leader, and an idealized, “default statement 
of mind that defines the self-identity of the decision maker.”63  
What does VICS do? It conducts a four-step analysis of sentences in a given text. 
It first identifies whether the subject referenced is the self or other. It then identifies the 
tense of the verb as past, present, or future and the category of the verb as positive or 
                                                 
62 Walker et. al., “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis,” 182. 
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negative, based on dictionary codings. It then identifies the domain as domestic or 
foreign and a target and a context for the statement. The software package then analyzes 
the balance between the frequencies of these categories and generates index variables. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the documents described in the introduction and 
strategic chapter sections were prepared for analysis by VICS through the Profiler Plus 
software package. This software allows for aggregate analysis of a large number of data 
sources that yields results similar to Leites’ and George’s original theory while allowing 
for a much larger volume of data.  
Similar to the methodology for strategic culture analysis, this thesis will present 
predictions for the answers to the philosophical and instrumental questions posed by 
George, and then compare them to the data generated by VICS. The predictions take the 
form of “operational code indices,” described by Walker et. al. as a method of linking the 
operational code construct with a meaningful index for comparison.64 This work 
considers the diagnostic and choice propensities because they best relate to the data and 
methodology. In effect, this thesis will provide predictions for index values based on how 
decision making has been characterized by prior research, and then conduct an analysis of 
this data set to see whether prior research has captured accurately the decision-making 
process. 
The program computes the scores in a unique format that requires explanation.65 
As mentioned, the major output is in the form of index variables that range from negative 
to positive. There are sixteen index variables divided between “philosophical” and 
“instrumental” beliefs, in line with George’s ten questions about operational code beliefs. 
Philosophical beliefs are denoted by P-x, where x represents the number of the question 
or variable and instrumental beliefs are denoted by I-x. Philosophical and instrumental 
beliefs are akin to the strategic versus the tactical realm. As the meanings of the variables 
could be unclear, I will provide some details about the philosophical variables followed 
by the instrumental variables. 
                                                 
64 Walker et. al., “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis,” 178–181. 
65 The following comes from Stephen G. Walker, “Forecasting the Political Behavior of Leaders with 
the Verbs in Context System of Operational Code Analysis,” p. 10–5, written between 2000–2004 as a 
research report contracted by Social Science Automation, Inc. Cited with permission. 
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P-1 refers to the nature of the political universe and ranges from -.75 to +.75. The 
question here is whether the nature of the political universe is inherently hostile or 
friendly, with the lower score meaning hostile and the higher score meaning friendly. The 
idea of a spectrum like this suggests that leaders may not view conflict and cooperation 
entirely as opposites. P-2 refers to the ability of a leader to realize inherent political 
values, whether it is possible to accomplish goals in the international system or not and 
ranges from -.75 to +.75 with the low score meaning accomplishing goals are unlikely 
and vice-versa. P-3 refers to the predictability of the political system, whether it is 
possible to predict future events and power balances and ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 with the 
lower range meaning it is not possible and vice versa. P-4 refers to the extent to which 
human beings have control over the flow of history, in essence whether humans shape the 
world or whether the world shapes humans and ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 with the lower 
range meaning humans cannot shape the world and vice versa. P-5 refers to the extent to 
which chance plays a role in historical and political development and ranges from 0.0 to 
1.0 with the lower range meaning chance plays little to no role. 
I-1 refers to whether conflict or cooperation strategies are the best in the political 
universe and ranges from -.75 to +.75 with the lower range meaning conflict strategies 
are best. I-2 refers to whether conflict or cooperation tactics are the best in the political 
universe, which is closely related to but slightly different from I-1 and ranges from -.75 
to +.75 with the lower range meaning conflict tactics are best. I-3 refers to a leader’s risk 
orientation, whether he is risk acceptant or risk averse and ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 with the 
lower range meaning he is risk averse. I-4a and I-4b refer to the extent to which political 
leaders are willing to shift between cooperation and conflict and words and deeds, 
meaning the ability of a leader to use flexibility in shifting between different kinds of 
tactics as a risk management technique. These range from 0.0 to 1.0, with the lower range 
meaning flexibility is very low. I-5 is separated into six index variables referring to the 
extent to which leaders are willing to utilize different means in a given political universe. 




support, promise refers to the use of promises, threat refers to the use of threat, and so on. 
These range from 0.0 to 1.0, with the lower range meaning utility is very low and vice 
versa. 
Scoring is done with indices. The indices have a low to high range and certain 
descriptions are attached to high versus low scores, which are logical: a low P-1 score 
means the leader feels the universe is definitely or somewhat hostile. Some of the 
variables are related – for example, I-1 and P-1 should probably follow each other, as 
should P-2 and I-2. The I-5 variables, the categories for the exercise of political power, 
should add to 1.0 or close to it, and the scores within the overall I-5 framework refer to 
the relationship between the categories. Put another way, an I-5 (Appeal) score that is 
double I-5 (Oppose/Resist) would mean the leader believes appeals are twice as useful as 

















Question Jimmy Carter (1980) Bill Clinton (1993) Lyndon Johnson 
(1964–5) 
Philosophical    
P-1: What is the “essential” 
nature of political life? Is the 
political universe one of 
harmony or conflict? 
.06 .28 .23 
P-2: What are the prospects for 
the eventual realization of one’s 
fundamental political values 
and aspirations? 
.05 .36 .10 
P-3: Is the political future 
predictable? In what sense and 




P-4: How much “control” or 
“mastery” can one have over 
historical development? What is 
one’s role in “moving” or 
“shaping” history in the desired 
direction? 
.75 .63 .62 
P-5 What is the role of 
“chance” in human affairs and 
in historical development? 
.74 .85 .83 
Instrumental    
I-1: What is the best approach 
for selecting goals or objectives 




I-2: How are the goals of action 
pursued most effectively? 
.57 .55 .32 
I-3: How are the risks of 
political action calculated, 
controlled, and accepted? 
.30 .19 .41 
I-4a: Words/Deeds .79  -- .27 
I-4b: Conflict/Cooperation .27 -- .30 
I-5: Appeal .02 -- .69 
I-5: Promise .45  -- .09 
I-5: Reward .40  -- .11 
I-5: Oppose .01 -- .12 
I-5: Threat .00 -- .01 
I-5: Punish .11 -- .02 
Table 1.   United States Operational Code Scores 
Some baseline scores are displayed in Table 1.66 These come from Walker et. al’s 
analysis of Jimmy Carter’s operational code, as well as from analyses of Bill Clinton and 
Lyndon Johnson’s codes. In their analysis, they examined his operational code in 1977–
79 and 1980 and conducted statistical analysis to see whether it differed. They did find a 
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statistically significant difference in the extent to which he found the political universe 
cooperative after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets. They also found a 
significant decrease in optimism.67 This demonstrates the utility of the methodology in 
how it reflects a subject’s reaction to history. It also shows a possible danger in the 
methodology in that scores could be too responsive when considering individuals over 
long durations of time. As this thesis uses a fairly short period of time for both of the 
cases, this methodological pitfall should be avoided. Here, the scores for 1980 as 
presented as an example of what operational code output looks like. The authors 
demonstrate that Jimmy Carter’s operational code has:  
Philosophical elements characterized by a cooperative view of the 
political universe (P-1), optimism regarding the realization of political 
goals (P-2), but a view of the universe (P-3) as relatively unpredictable 
due to its complex interdependence; therefore, even though he may have a 
relatively strong belief (P-4) in his ability to control historical 
development, he attributes a high value to the role of chance (P-5). 
Carter’s general operational code should have instrumental elements 
characterized by a cooperative strategy (I- 1) and cooperative tactical 
intensity (1–2), plus a risk orientation that is relatively risk averse because 
of the complexity of the world. He should be more acceptant of the risks 
of submission than deadlock because of a low propensity to shift his 
cooperative strategy and tactics (I-4a), though perhaps moderated by a 
higher propensity to shift between words and deeds (I-4b) to control 
against the risk of being exploited by others. As a cooperative moralist, 
Carter should have a propensity to use positive rather than negative 
sanctions as useful means (1–5) for exercising power.68 
These data should be considered a baseline for the analysis of Chinese and 
Japanese operational code to follow. It also serves as an example of how an operational 
code is describe in text. Estimates for Bill Clinton69 and Lyndon Johnson’s70 operational 
codes are also provided in Table 1 to serve as additional baselines and to demonstrate 
                                                 
67 Walker et. al., “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis,” 186. 
68 Walker et. al., “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis,”184. 
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how the range of different scores across U.S. leaders. Clinton’s code is incomplete, as the 
authors of that study focused only on the indices they deemed to be most relevant for 
discussion of source material bias. There are some differences among the baselines, 
particularly between Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter who have wildly different scores 
for I-5 tactics.  
D. CASE BASELINES 
While there has not been significant work on a Japanese operational code, the 
operational code of the Chinese Politburo and Mao Zedong during the time period in 
question has enjoyed some attention.71 Robert North wrote a monograph on the subject 
as that addressed methodological concerns and suggested methods for investigating the 
Politburo’s operational code. He emphasized the value of aggregate data analysis. None 
of his conclusions, however, directly address the questions posed by George. This is 
reasonable given the George article codifying the operational code construct was 
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Question Japan China 
Philosophical   
P-1: What is the “essential” nature of 
political life? Is the political universe 
one of harmony or conflict? 
Negative (conflictual) .43 
P-2: What are the prospects for the 
eventual realization of one’s 
fundamental political values and 
aspirations? 
Negative (pessimistic) .26 
P-3: Is the political future 
predictable? In what sense and to 
what extent? 
Greater than 0.50 (predictable) .10 
P-4: How much “control” or 
“mastery” can one have over 
historical development? What is 
one’s role in “moving” or “shaping” 
history in the desired direction? 
Greater than 0.50 (self locus of 
control) 
.29 
P-5 What is the role of “chance” in 
human affairs and in historical 
development? 
Lower than 0.50 (Lower role of 
chance) 
.97 
Instrumental   
I-1: What is the best approach for 
selecting goals or objectives for 
political action? 
Negative (conflictual strategy) .23 
I-2: How are the goals of action 
pursued most effectively? 
Negative (conflictual tactics) .00 
I-3: How are the risks of political 
action calculated, controlled, and 
accepted? 
Greater than 0.50 (Risk 
acceptant) 
.32 
I-4a: Words Less than 0.50  .67 
I-4b: Deeds Greater than 0.50 .45 
I-5: Appeal Less than 0.50  .56 
I-5: Promise Less than 0.50  .00 
I-5: Reward Less than 0.50  .06 
I-5: Oppose Greater than 0.50 .23 
I-5: Threat Greater than 0.50 .00 
I-5: Punish Greater than 0.50 .17 
Table 2.   Hypothetical Operational Code Scores 
1. China 
A more recent monograph by Huiyun Feng considers the operational code of the 
Chinese Politburo in three historical periods: the Korean War (1950–1953), the Sino-
Indian War (1962), and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). Feng uses the same VICS 
methodology but adds sources in native Chinese. Her assessment of Mao and Zhou’s 
operational codes can be found in Figure 2. These are mean scores for pre-war, war, and 
post-war periods in the Korean War. This thesis will take her results for post-war Zhou 
Enlai as baseline values for the evaluation of the CWIHP sources, which are largely 
composed on Zhou’s writing and speeches.  
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2. Japan 
Analysis of a Japanese operational code does not exist. It will therefore be the 
contribution of this thesis to try to specify the elements of the operational code of the 
Japanese Imperial Liaison conferences, and then to understand how it differs from the 
code of the Chinese Politburo. In this way the Chinese operational code will be a sort of 
benchmark by which the Japanese code can be judged. Moreover, sound analysis of both 
the Chinese and Japanese operational codes allows for comparison with strategic culture 
conceptions of decision making, which could provide insight into the types of sources to 
analyze and the different conclusions that can be drawn from each. 
To this end, this thesis proposes preliminary operational code scores on the basis 
of the literature on Japanese decision making.72 The scores are found in Table 2, along 
with Feng’s estimates for Zhou Enlai. Due to the lack of formal analysis, these 
predictions are general, pointing only in the general directions for each question. This 
hypothesis closely follows the hypothesis for Japanese strategic culture. In general, Japan 
found the international community to be a dangerous place with few prospects for 
cooperation. But Japanese leaders felt that they could have control over their future and 
to an extent shape the world. Finally, Japanese leaders felt that force was an acceptable 
and probably the best way to take political action in the international arena.  
These statements may seem like sweeping generalizations, but they follow from 
the arguments about Japanese strategic culture. If operational code is meant to be a series 
of rules by which a ruling class operates within the world, it can be taken to be an 
extension of sorts, or a variation of the rules of, a strategic culture. In principle they have 
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the same idea, but they are found in the data in different ways. Where strategic culture 
allows for close readings of data sources to generate a holistic view of a culture, 
operational code takes a broader approach that sacrifices depth for concreteness. In 
general, operational code results yield conceptions of decision making derived from a 
statistical model. A good research design is a prerequisite to interpret the results. It is 
more systematic than strategic culture, but depth is definitely lost.  
The following section will present the results for the operational code analysis 
conducted on the data used in this thesis. It will discuss differences between the 
“experimental”73 results and the hypothesized operational code scores. It will then 
discuss some challenges in operational code analysis that may have influenced the results 
presented here.  
E. RESULTS 
 Table 3 displays the results of the analysis conducted on the two bodies of texts. 
The data were minimally modified before processing; headings and page numbers were 
removed, as well as quotations from speakers not from the country in question. Other text 
added by editors during the translation process was also largely removed, including 
footnotes and descriptions in-text about context for meetings or speeches. What were left 
were single documents of almost purely quotations and documents from the leaders of 
both countries in question. The ProfilerPlus software package was able to process these 
documents with few errors using the operational code scheme provided by Social Science 
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Question Japan China 
Philosophical   
P-1: What is the “essential” nature of 
political life? Is the political universe 
one of harmony or conflict? 
.20 .35 
P-2: What are the prospects for the 
eventual realization of one’s 
fundamental political values and 
aspirations? 
.06 .13 
P-3: Is the political future 
predictable? In what sense and to 
what extent? 
.07 .14 
P-4: How much “control” or 
“mastery” can one have over 
historical development? What is 
one’s role in “moving” or “shaping” 
history in the desired direction? 
.27 .20 
P-5 What is the role of “chance” in 
human affairs and in historical 
development? 
.9811 .972 
Instrumental   
I-1: What is the best approach for 
selecting goals or objectives for 
political action? 
.33 .49 
I-2: How are the goals of action 
pursued most effectively? 
.09 .19 
I-3: How are the risks of political 
action calculated, controlled, and 
accepted? 
.17 .27 
I-4a: Words .67 .51 
I-4b: Deeds .53 .31 
I-5: Appeal .50 .59 
I-5: Promise .04 .06 
I-5: Reward .12 .09 
I-5: Oppose .15 .17 
I-5: Threat .04 .03 
I-5: Punish .15 .06 
Table 3.   Experimental Operational Code Scores 
1. China 
Chinese operational code demonstrates a cooperative view of the political 
universe (P-1), slight optimism regarding the realization of political goals (P-2), a view of 
the universe (P-3) as unpredictable due to its complex interdependence, a weak belief (P-
4) in the ability of humans to control historical development, and accordingly a high 
value to the role of chance (P-5). China’s operational code should have instrumental 
elements characterized by a cooperative strategy (I-1) and slightly cooperative tactical 
intensity (I-2). Their risk orientation is relatively risk acceptant (I-3). Chinese leaders 
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have a strong propensity to shift cooperative strategies and tactics (I-4a) and a slightly 
weaker propensity to shift between words and deeds (I-4b). Chinese leaders definitely 
view appeals (I-5) as the best tactics to use, thereby signaling their attraction to 
cooperation. 
The results for Chinese operational code show similarity to the results generated 
by Feng’s estimates for just Zhou Enlai. Feng’s analysis focused on just Zhou Enlai, and 
since Zhou and his team provided the majority of the evidence for this thesis, it is a ready 
opportunity to test the validity of operational analysis results. Chinese decision making in 
relation to the Geneva conference was somewhat predicated toward harmony and 
cooperation and somewhat optimistic possibilities toward realization of political values 
and control over historical development. Decision-makers were more willing to be 
flexible in terms of changing strategies with words than with deeds, with .51 for I-4a 
and .31 for I-4b. They also valued appeal strategies far more than any others, 3.4 times 
more than the next highest scoring strategy. In this respect they were closer to Jimmy 
Carter’s flexibility of action, but Lyndon Johnson’s overall tactics. 
It is important to note that Chinese decision-makers seemed to be very moderate 
in their feelings. They did not have strong philosophical leanings in any direction, 
preferring a more balanced approach that would allow in practice for a wide variety of 
strategies to be pursued. In these results, Chinese decision-makers do not explicitly rule 
out any strategies, and while they favor some more than others, the extent to which they 
prefer them is only slightly more with the exception of I-5 (Appeal). However, when 
compared to Jimmy Carter’s operational code, who had a score of .06 for P-1, 
China’s .35 score is fairly strong inclination toward harmony, even higher than Bill 
Clinton and Lyndon Johnson, although only by a small amount.  
The results of the CWIHP document set are not that different from Feng’s 
estimate of Zhou Enlai’s operational code. But the CWIHP results are less intensive 
toward the positive, indicating that the decision making body analyzed there is less 
concerned with a worldview of harmony (P-1), realization of aspirations (P-2), and 
control over history (P-4). But it is also much more concerned with cooperation 
strategies, as the I-1 score is almost doubled in the CWIHP results.  
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 There are several reasons why this could be the case. First, an individual will 
likely have stronger feelings than a group. That is, organizational processes can serve to 
filter more radical views held by individuals such that the group view and policy is 
moderated. While the documents themselves were individually produced, when analyzed 
all together they should be considered as a product of an organization and a process. 
Since the CWIHP sample contains speeches and statements by actors other than just 
Zhou Enlai, it is possible that this expanded sample could lead to somewhat different 
results simply because the sample of decision-makers is larger. Second, the CWIHP 
sample deals exclusively with a tense strategic situation over the course of a few weeks, 
rather than Feng’s analysis that took place over a longer period of time. In a short period 
of time, the memory effects of recent history could be intensified. In the Chinese case, 
decision-makers should have recalled strongly the failures of aggressive strategy during 
the Korean War and would have been more amenable to cooperation opportunities. 
It would also be interesting to consider why I-5 (Appeal) shows so strongly in this 
sample. This score indicates that a cooperative strategy of appealing with words to an 
opponent is favored much more strongly than anything else. It is possible this is the case 
because the document sample is drawn from a conference centered around diplomacy, 
where such appeals to both friends and adversaries would be natural. The above note 
about waning Chinese power in this period could be important as well. Appeals would be 
among the cooperation strategies Chinese leaders would pursue if they felt weak. Finally, 
several of the documents are outward facing or describe outward facing events. Put 
another way, since several of the documents relate to interactions with the outside world, 
where Chinese diplomats would probably engage in behavior that looks like appeal to the 
outside, but was not actually meant to be. Outward facing events are probably more likely 
to have elements of an appeal strategy, and that is a possible reason for why this score is 
so high.   
2. Japan 
Japanese operational code demonstrates a cooperative view of the political 
universe (P-1), very slight optimism regarding the realization of political goals (P-2), a 
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view of the universe (P-3) as unpredictable due to its complex interdependence, a weak 
belief (P-4) in the ability of humans to control historical development, and accordingly a 
high value to the role of chance (P-5). Japan’s operational code should have instrumental 
elements characterized by a cooperative strategy (I- 1) and slightly cooperative tactical 
intensity (I-2). Their risk orientation is very risk acceptant (I-3). Japanese leaders have a 
strong propensity to shift cooperative strategies and tactics (I-4a) and a strong propensity 
to shift between words and deeds (I-4b). Japanese leaders view appeals (I-5) as the best 
tactics to use, thereby signaling their attraction to cooperation. 
In contrast to the Chinese results, the Japanese results are widely different from 
what would be predicted by strategic culture. The examination of liaison meeting 
transcripts from a strategic culture perspective yielded a Japanese operational code that 
was anti-cooperation, in control of its destiny, and that favored aggression rather than 
cooperation or peaceful means. This conception comes from the overwhelming drive 
toward war the Japanese government demonstrated during the summer of 1941 despite 
failed efforts at diplomacy or compromise. The actual demonstrated operational code 
shows a conflicted group of leaders in many ways straddling the border between conflict 
and cooperation; rather than being averse to cooperation and harmony in world politics, 
Japanese leaders seem to be somewhat inclined toward it, and particularly inclined 
toward cooperative strategies and the meaning of language. It actually seems that the 
Japanese operational code is similar to the Chinese operational code and that both are 
different from Jimmy Carter’s. This would indicate a different worldview from Jimmy 
Carter’s, which emphasizes fence-sitting rather than strong principled stances. 
Why would an operational code assessment of the same documents yield nearly 
the opposite results to a strategic culture analysis? The biggest reason may be the nature 
of strategic culture analysis. Strategic culture analysis involves identifying quotes that are 
illustrative of a state’s strategic culture out of a random sample, with a risk  of 
misinterpreting evidence and discounting pieces that do not fit the analyst’s version of a 
country’s strategic culture. This version of operational code analysis, which uses a 
software package to analyze all of the evidence in a given body of data, could yield 
different results because it incorporates a larger body of evidence. At a conceptual level, 
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it could also be that operational code and strategic culture characterize the same decision-
making style but in different forms. This concept will be discussed in the following 
chapter.  
That does not answer the question of whether it would be possible for Japanese 
decision making to have actually exhibited these characteristics. It is strange that the 
Japanese scores would be so close to Chinese scores, and in particular demonstrate 
proclivity to cooperation. An answer could lie in the nature of Japanese decision making, 
in that it was relatively centralized and the opinions of all the actors were not always 
taken into account. Japanese leaders often talked about diplomacy and reconciliation with 
the United States and the other major powers, but yet still prepared for war. Due to the 
pushing of key attendees in the liaison conferences, such as Tojo Hideki and the various 
military liaison officers, Japan ultimately still went to war. Therefore, what would be 
exhibited in the data is a group of decision-makers striving for peace, but other pressures 
would prevent that from showing up in the actual historical record.  
Something interesting in both the Chinese and Japanese results is a high 
propensity of believing in the importance of chance. For both China and Japan the results 
are close to 1.0, nearly the maximum. This seems unusually high, even given Feng’s high 
results. Compared to Jimmy Carter’s P-5 score, 0.74, values so close to 1.0 are unusual. 
This could be indicative of an error in data coding or in the analytical scheme. It seems 
wise to take this figure with skepticism. 
F. ANALYSIS 
 This chapter has considered operational code methodology and its application to 
Japanese and Chinese decision making. It described the methodology used, provided 
preliminary operational code scores for both cases, and then conducted operational code 
analysis on the two sets of documents used in this thesis. The Chinese data was consistent 
with past research, but the Japanese data was highly inconsistent. Possible reasons were 
explored and will be elaborated on in the following chapter. 
 The central questions this thesis is meant to answer are all addressed by 
operational code analysis. Operational code analysis does give a clearer understanding of 
 48 
Japanese and Chinese decision making; it takes primary source material and turns it into 
good evidence for further discussion. It also shows how Japan and China differ and how 
operational code and strategic culture differ, things that will be discussed in the following 
chapter. Future research on Japanese and Chinese operational code could use primary 
source material in the original languages to be more accurate, as well as utilize some of 




The prior analysis of Japanese and Chinese decision making has revealed several 
important results about the nature of the decision-making process and strategic mindset in 
a way that has not been done before. This chapter will interpret those results to paint a 
clearer portrait of decision making that ties together the two lenses of analyses and shows 
how they complement one another. It will also discuss challenges faced by using this 
methodology and possible ways to improve upon it. To accomplish this, this chapter is 
divided into five sections: first, an analysis of how strategic culture and operational differ 
and how they are complementary with respect to analyzing decision making; second, a 
general description of the Japanese decision-making process synthesizing the viewpoints 
of strategic culture and operational code; third, a general description of the Chinese 
decision-making process doing the same thing; fourth, a comparison of Japanese and 
Chinese decision making; and fifth, an assessment of strategic culture and operational 
code compared to realism. 
B.  STRATEGIC CULTURE AND OPERATIONAL CODE IN COMPARISON 
These analytical methods illuminate different aspects of Chinese and Japanese 
decision making, and it is worthwhile to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
each, where they overlap, and the best ways for them to be combined to illuminate 
different aspects of decision making most effectively. 
 Strategic culture theory’s major strength is in its ability to take the long view and 
consider how decision making may be affected by history. In these cases it was 
particularly evident in how strategic culture theory was able to demonstrate how the 
Chinese historical experience affected Zhou Enlai’s approach to strategy at Geneva, or 
how a culture of militarism and a hierarchical authority structure in Japan contributed to 
war-mongers taking power. Strategic culture’s emphasis on socio-cultural factors is 
important, as no other method of analysis incorporates such factors in such a way. Many 
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standard international relations theories, such as realism or liberalism, place less 
importance on culture and history, preferring instead to make broader or more 
parsimonious assumptions on what drives behavior. Methods that do include cultural 
factors, such as constructivism, do not emphasize analysis of social, economic, or 
political structures in society or aspects of geography and natural resources that strategic 
culture claims to shape the innate nature of a society. 
 Strategic culture, however, has weaknesses as well. One weakness of strategic 
culture is that it is often difficult to determine what exactly “counts” as strategic culture. 
What could be interpreted as strategic culture by one person could be interpreted as 
behavior driven by realism by another. This does not negate the value of strategic culture; 
it just makes it more difficult to argue about it relative to other theories of international 
relations. Another weakness is that it can be construed as giving just broad 
generalizations without much actual substance. China can be argued to be wary of 
foreigners, but what state is not? Both of these weaknesses hinge upon the fact that 
strategic culture interpretation is just that—interpretation. Without a frame of reference, 
which often is not provided, it can be difficult to understand why one researcher 
interprets data in one way or another. 
 Operational code analysis is important in the way it uses linguistics to understand 
behavior. As mentioned, it differs from strategic culture by analyzing an entire data 
sample without the possibility of leaving anything out. It is more systematic, but it 
sacrifices breadth for depth; it is impossible to do close readings of data samples with 
operational code analysis, which relies on quantitative analysis based on linguistic data. 
The main issue with operational code analysis is that it is reflective of the data sample 
used for analysis, and if the data is chosen incorrectly there could be wildly different 
results across analyses. A leader that feels a certain way could have a totally different 
feeling following a major event, leading to a reversal in operational code scores. 
Therefore, it seems to be most useful for time-series analysis of the extent to which 
leaders changed over their tenure or to tightly focused time periods where there should 
not be significant change.  
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This variability is a weakness in analysis, as choosing the wrong time period 
could yield nearly useless results. However, when conducted correctly, analysis should 
highlight not only how much scores change over time, but also why. Relating the 
changing scores back to the nature of shocks would demonstrate what elements of such 
changes are more influential, allowing for greater predictive capacity of how shocks 
should affect leaders of the same traits in the future. 
 When viewed in this way, with operational code assessing the short-term and 
strategic culture assessing the long-term, in a way it is possible for operational code to 
validate some of the results of strategic culture. Put another way, operational code acts as 
a check for some of the conclusions drawn by strategic culture and serves to show 
irregularities in the results. Operational code and strategic culture analysis should 
generate similar outcomes, and as they both rely on a methodology of examining similar 
cultural norms and patterns of behavior. If they were to differ significantly it would be 
cause for concern and would need to be explained. The approach taken in the rest of this 
chapter is to consider a broad conception of decision making for the Chinese and 
Japanese cases and then to consider the relationship between strategic culture and 
operational code within them. 
C. CONCEPTION OF JAPANESE DECISION MAKING 
 This section will summarize and analyze the results of the analysis of Japanese 
decision making conducted through the lenses of strategic culture and operational code 
analysis. Strategic culture analysis is in line with prior results, which is due in part to the 
fact that the data used for this thesis was probably used for prior strategic culture analysis 
of Japanese decision making. Operational code analysis of the same documents shows 
almost the exact opposite results. It is necessary to reconcile these results before arriving 
at an overall picture of decision making. 
 To recap the results from the analysis, strategic culture analysis demonstrated that 
Japanese decision making exhibits three characteristics: reticence to act and 
unwillingness to accept negative data, a disposition toward favoring militarism to solve 
problems, and deference toward superiors sometimes leading to personalities dominating 
 52 
discussions rather than facts. This is consistent across all of the Japanese documents 
examined and is supported by past research, and it seems to be a strong result. A picture 
of Japanese decision making painted just by the strategic culture lens would show an 
insular culture, focused on tradition and devoted to preserving its own culture and willing 
to take all steps necessary to ensure its dominance on the world stage. A strong military 
tradition running through Japanese culture, supplemented by state efforts to keep it alive, 
led to the pushes for militarism shown in the documents. 
 Operational code analysis emphasized/called our attention different patterns of 
behaviors. Rather than an insular group of leaders, operational code analysis 
demonstrated a conflict group of leaders more interested in cooperation than one would 
originally think. Japanese leaders held a relatively harmonious view of the international 
system, with relatively high prospects for realization of goals through peaceful means. 
They believed in cooperative strategies like appeals to adversaries, and on a whole they 
valued the meaning of words more than deeds. If viewed without context, this picture of 
decision making shows a leadership group that is open to negotiation, interested in peace, 
and seeking cooperative ventures in the international community. In some ways, it is very 
different from the picture painted by the strategic culture approach. 
 These two results need not preclude one another. Rather, these two approaches 
could illuminate difference aspects of the same overall decision-making model. Japanese 
decision making could be at once insular and militaristic, while at the same time open to 
the world and interested in cooperation. While the results do seem to be opposite, it is 
possible to look at moments in time when Japanese leaders were militaristic, such as 
when Foreign Minister Matsuoka pushed for war with the Soviet Union, as well as times 
when they were open to negotiation, such as the continued push for stabilization talks 
with the United States. 
 There are several reasons why both of these realities exist in one set of 
documents. First, there was a Cabinet change during the period the sources cover. As 
some Cabinet ministers changed, the balance of power within the liaison conferences 
changed, as well as the priority of topics they covered. With Matsuoka’s departure, a 
drive toward war with the Soviet Union was less prevalent, although a drive for war with 
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the United States and United Kingdom became an overriding agenda item. This change in 
ministers was reflected in the documents with relatively more discussion about 
diplomacy after Matsuoka’s departure. 
 Second, the selection of sources could play a role. These meetings were held 
during a time when the Japanese army was engaging in military operations in China. The 
“China Incident,” as it was called, was yet to be resolved after four years of open warfare 
with Chinese factions. While leadership attention was directed toward more imminent 
threats as the summer went on, at the beginning of the summer of 1941, Japanese leaders 
still sometimes discussed Chinese operations. In the operational code analysis, this would 
show up as a propensity toward conflict, but this effect drops off after the summer began 
and negotiations with other actors started in earnest. 
Third, Japanese leaders were risk averse and pursued both military and diplomatic 
tracks as a hedging strategy. Japanese leaders wanted stability above all as Japan faced 
economic challenges. This disparity in results is possible because while Japanese leaders 
discussed military action often in their meetings, they discussed diplomatic talks with all 
manner of actors on a regular basis. They discussed relations with Germany, the Soviet 
Union, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands while talking about a 
military option as a last resort. Reading the documents in a certain way could even 
convince a reader that Japanese leaders preferred negotiations first and only went to war 
when their hand was forced. 
Fourth, there is a limited extent to which the liaison conferences would discuss 
operational or strategic aspects of conflict and military operations. While the liaison 
conferences laid down policy guidance to military leaders, it was the responsibility of the 
Imperial General Headquarters to develop operational plans. It is possible that a military 
option was always something that weighed heavy in the minds of Japanese leaders, and 
thus it did not need to be discussed in open meetings, where time could be better spent 
discussion diplomatic strategies that could avert war and still achieve Japanese ends. It is 
also possible that much discussion of military options were held outside of formal 
meetings, and therefore out of the scope of these sources. It may not have been politically 
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palatable to discuss the prospects for war in these meetings, leading ministers to develop 
plans independently and present them to the body only when it was absolutely necessary.  
These factors probably contributed to making Japanese decision making appear 
two-faced when viewed through different lenses. What was the “actual” way Japanese 
leaders thought and made decisions? As I have hinted, it is probably a hybrid of both of 
these approaches. Japanese leaders did not wish for war, but they also recognized the 
need for Japan to become a great power to fuel its economy. Japanese thinking favored 
war as a baseline option for foreign interaction, but they repeatedly recognized that they 
probably could not defeat the industrial might of the United States and the United 
Kingdom in prolonged conflict. They probably thought of the world as a dangerous place, 
or else they would not have made such elaborate preparations for war, but they thought 
that cooperation could save the day, or else they would not have tried such extensive 
diplomatic campaigns. While this may seem like a paradox, it is a strategically-wise 
approach: prepare for war but try to achieve peace. Whether this approach led the 
Japanese down a path toward war that they could not remove themselves from is a 
question for future research work.  
A composite view of decision making that integrates elements from both theories 
is desirable. However, it is difficult to create such composite looks consistently, as there 
is no exact formula for picking and choosing the best aspects of theory and throwing 
away the rest. Still, there is value from drawing from different theories in trying to 
explain decision making, and an attempt at moving toward a comprehensive view is 
worth considering, which follows. . When presented with a problem, Japanese leaders 
would deliberate it to a certain extent, but leave much of the planning and policy analysis 
to middle-ranking officials. They would then come together in liaison conferences to 
discuss research conducted or steps taken to address problems. As a body they would 
discuss problems with an eye at compelling other ministers to act in certain ways. They 
would then take a policy document developed by consensus to the Emperor, who would 
give an official assent to whatever policy was in question. While this process was 
happening, various bureaucratic actors in the government were in action, and the process 
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as a whole was shaped by elements of Japanese strategic culture and operational code that 
led leaders to consider seriously war against the world’s major powers in the name of 
power and stability. 
D. CONCEPTION OF CHINESE DECISION MAKING 
This section will summarize and analyze the results of the analysis of Chinese 
decision making conducted through the lenses of strategic culture and operational code 
analysis. Both strategic culture and operational code analysis yield results similar to prior 
research. This is a sign that the analytical model used in this thesis is robust and could 
help to confirm the results for both Chinese and Japanese decision making. However, 
there are some differences in how operational code and strategic culture portray decision 
making that will be explored in this section. A synthesis of the strategic culture and 
operational code lenses yields a view of Chinese decision making that is distrustful out of 
the outside world but cognizant of China’s relative weakness and need for cooperation to 
avoid more destructive conflict. 
 The strategic culture analysis focused on two aspects of decision making that 
were driven by cultural characteristics: perceptions of national security interests and 
perceptions of foreigners. That is, national security interests were driven by an insistence 
of border security and national autonomy, and Chinese leaders were strongly distrustful 
of foreigners and suffered from general xenophobia. A close reading of documents from 
the Geneva Conference showed evidence for uniquely Chinese perceptions of both of 
these things, with nearly half of the documents containing supporting evidence. 
 As a proxy for a Chinese operational code, this thesis used an estimate of Zhou 
Enlai’s operational code from past research. The operational code analysis conducted on 
the Geneva documents shows that the operational code in effect at Geneva was similar to 
Zhou Enlai’s postwar code. There is slight disposition toward harmony, predictability, 
and cooperation. The fact that it mostly parallels Zhou Enlai’s code is due to the fact that 
the majority of the documents considered were penned by Zhou himself, but the fact that 
the results persisted even with the influence of other actors speaks to the relative validity 
of this methodology. 
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 In some respects, this demonstrates that Chinese decision making, in some 
respects, also had two faces to it. It had the overtly anti-cooperation worldview coming 
from a period of humiliation by western powers, but it also had a somewhat optimistic 
outlook and willingness to cooperate with the west. This is with the caveat that this 
measures only the feeling of leaders and not necessarily how they will always act in 
reality; discussion does not always translate to action. This caveat holds true for all 
operational code results. This composite view of Chinese decision making shows that 
leaders, when presented with a problem, at first viewed it with caution and distrust of 
outside interference. Leaders then deliberated the issue and as a united front presented 
their findings, incorporating a more realistic worldview due to constraints on resources. 
Their worldview was shaped by history and culture, which was then manifest in the 
statements made to foreign actors and the kinds of actions undertaken. It was a 
centralized decision-making process that, from the outside, appeared to show unity 
throughout the process. There does not seem to be evidence that the foreign ministry, 
acting under Zhou Enlai, did anything that would run counter to Beijing’s wishes.  
 The main contribution of this thesis, therefore, is to show how strategic culture 
and operational code influenced the decision-making process. In other words, in the 
absence of these factors, Chinese decision making could have taken a different direction 
from what actually happened. If Chinese leaders were not distrustful of the United States 
and the other western powers at Geneva, it is possible to imagine that negotiations would 
have been much shorter and that China would have been more willing to allow for 
western involvement in repatriation and stability operations in Indochina.  Further, if 
there were less of a concern about border integrity and the dangers of becoming 
surrounded in a dangerous world, it is possible that Chinese involvement in Korea could 
have been minimized. It is hard to say whether these trends still persist in Chinese 
decision making. From the movements China has made over the last decade to assert its 
power over the South China Sea, as well as with its expanding economic influence, 




Chinese pattern of behavior. If these two factors, among others, do persist, they should be 
factored into account when making strategy and policy assessments about the rise of 
China. 
What is not seen to a great extent in these documents is a concern with 
Communist ideology and the people’s war. There are a few quotes that point to this belief 
in Zhou Enlai’s speeches, such as in Document #16, a telegram from Zhou Enlai to the 
Central Committee. Zhou noted that during discussion about Indochina, he rebutted a 
point made by the United States with the following: 
We absolutely cannot agree to this point. Pham Van Dong, Molotov, and I 
all spoke to rebut this point, pointing out that the armed struggle for 
national liberation by the Cambodian and Laotian people was caused by 
the military intervention of France. The resistance governments in 
Cambodia and Laos have their own troops. Therefore an armistice means 
that a ceasefire should occur on the territory of their own motherlands. 
Zhou’s commitment to the ideals of revolutionary struggle is exhibited here in his support 
for revolutionary forces. His referencing of motherlands and national liberation in 
opposition to foreign military intervention is an example of a reference to an ideology 
coming from Chinese history and culture. Moreover, Zhou’s usage of this language not 
only in public communication but also in private underscores his commitment to these 
ideals.   
 Other than that, however, in neither internal nor external communications is 
ideology referenced. This is strange given the extent to which Mao was able to shape the 
thought of Chinese leaders and the Chinese people with his philosophy, and the fact that 
the Chinese Communist Party has historically been prone to using ideology and 
propaganda to support its aims. It is especially strange given that many of these 
documents were outward-facing with prime opportunities for Zhou or other Chinese 
diplomats to propagate Maoist thought. It is possible that Zhou realized that foreign 
leaders would probably be less susceptible to such rhetoric and changed his tone of 
negotiation accordingly, but there probably should be some examples in internal 
communications and there is not. The real influence of ideology on Chinese communist 
thinking is a research topic that could be more fully explored. 
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E. COMPARING JAPANESE AND CHINESE DECISION MAKING 
This section examines the relationship between Chinese and Japanese decision 
making. As mentioned in Chapter One, these two cases are interesting to compare for 
several reasons. Both involve states in difficult strategic situations facing opposition to 
their goals from powerful actors in the international community. Both China and Japan 
had authoritarian, relatively centralized governments with unprecedented control over 
political decisions, as well as the ability to shape and mobilize a society. They both faced 
the United States and United Kingdom as their principal adversaries, and the majority of 
the diplomatic maneuvering involved how to deal with them. Their decision-making 
processes were also similar; both states utilized a centralized process oriented around an 
appointed cabinet that made sweeping policy decisions. Both states also had fairly similar 
historical experiences – both had recently experienced military successes in recent 
memory, although the Chinese experience was far more destructive to the government 
and society. While the timing of the cases differs, the strategic situation and decision-
making processes are similar enough for comparison. What also differs is the ideology 
and culture that influence both states. It would be interesting to think about whether 
differences in decision making could be attributed to cultural or ideological factors. 
 From what can be discerned from the Chinese data, it is interesting to note that 
when compared to the Japanese case, decisions seemed to be more easily communicated 
to field professionals and then executed in a manner the central government wanted. 
When Zhou Enlai received policy guidance from the Politburo about how to proceed at 
Geneva, he followed his orders and kept diversions to a minimum. On the other hand, 
Japanese ministers were less willing to keep to such a path. This is evidenced by Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka’s drive for war with the Soviet Union and even being willing to 
consider a non-aggression pact with the United States and even directing the ambassador 
in Washington to move in that path over the concerns of all other the other ministers at 
the liaison conference. This can be explained by cultural characteristics; the Japanese 
government did not operate under a cult of personality to the same extent as the Chinese 
government under Mao. While the Japanese Emperor was nominally worshipped by all 
ministers, the extent to which he had policy guidance and the loyalty of ministers like 
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Mao did is unclear and likely far less than in China. For this reason, ministers could have 
been more willing to take independent action that they felt would benefit Japan rather 
than toe the party line at all instances. Infighting in the liaison conferences was common, 
and if transcripts of Chinese Politburo meetings are ever published it would be interesting 
to see whether they are equally as contentious. Whether or not they are, the net effect was 
greater political control in the Chinese government and relatively less in the Japanese 
government. 
  Why does it appear in the operational code scoring that Japanese decision making 
is less prone to cooperation than Chinese? On the basis of the estimate scores, there is a 
significant difference between how Japanese and Chinese leaders feel. This could be 
attributed to several factors, with strategic culture possibly providing a good answer. The 
ideology of the Communist Chinese government after its consolidation of power over 
mainland China was to spread Maoist ideology throughout the world. Taking after the 
Soviet model of supporting fledgling states and gradually influencing domestic politics 
wherever they operated. Chinese support in Korea and Indochina is a good example of 
this, as the Chinese government provided men and materiel for combat operations in 
return for relative political loyalty. Due to this, Chinese leaders would view more 
opportunities for cooperation than Japanese leaders. Japanese ideology taught Japanese 
superiority over the rest of the world; there was no moral desire to spread the Japanese 
way of life or system to other places. Rather, Japanese leaders wanted to use those other 
places simply as tools to prop the Japanese domestic political and economic system. 
Without a real desire to spread Japanese values elsewhere, leaders probably would have 
regarded fewer interactions are cooperation opportunities, as they would evaluate other 
actors are prizes to be seized rather than partners with which to work.  
   A final example shows the extent to which different cultural characteristics 
played a role in influencing decision making. This is shown in how the different 
leadership teams acted as teams in their discussions and operations. On the basis of the 
evidence presented, it seems that Chinese leadership was better able to work as a team 
when compared to Japanese leadership. In this respect, Chinese leadership did not have 
as much visible infighting as did Japanese leaders, leading to somewhat negative 
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outcomes on the Japanese side. This is well-described above with the discussion of Zhou 
Enlai’s ability to toe the party line during Geneva. It is also seen in how Zhou’s team was 
consistent in its messaging to the French, such as when a French official asked one of 
Zhou’s aides why Zhou had not taken vacation time, and the aide replied with an 
admonishment about the importance of working hard. This is strange given that Japanese 
strategic culture theory predicts that Japanese leaders would be subservient to superiors. 
At the ministerial level, it is possible that no one viewed each other as superiors, and all 
as equals. At the same level, perhaps Japanese leaders felt that it was important to 
compete amongst themselves to show good performance. Chinese leaders, who were 
united by a cult of personality and common ideology, did not face the same pressure.  
F. THE CONTRAST WITH REALISM 
One of the central questions raised by this discussion is whether or not strategic 
culture and operational code add anything to study of strategic thinking that is not already 
understood by realism. Put another way, is it worth it to use these methodologies, or is a 
more parsimonious solution like realist thinking, which emphasizes the desire to acquire 
power, the most useful for thinking about behavior.  
With this in mind, what is the value of strategic culture for cases where it is hard 
to distinguish the effects? It is useful in these cases for understanding tactics—while 
realism can say much about the overall strategic direction of a state, strategic culture 
helps to shed light on elements of the tactics used to implement the strategy.  For 
example, the Japanese push to control mainland China from 1937 onward is puzzling 
from a strategic perspective. By the mid-1940s the Japanese government already 
controlled resource-rich Manchuria, which by that point was not fully developed for 
economic exploitation. Why would Japan support further military action in China if its 
goal was to become a dominant force in Asia? From a strategic perspective, the 
remainder of mainland China probably has little to offer the economic, political, or 
military structures that would feed off any value extracted. Trying to take and hold such a 
large land area would have been difficult under the best of circumstances, and with 
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threats of conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom it 
seems irrational from a realist perspective to try for military solutions in China.  
 The strategic culture perspective would point to the culture of militarism within 
the Japanese government, a lack of willingness by leaders to accept difficult facts, and a 
sense of unity within the government all contributed to military expansion in China. 
Militarism made both military and political leaders amenable to conquest as an option to 
support hegemonic aspirations. A lack of unwillingness to accept negative data would 
blind leaders into thinking that actions could be successful. Unity within government 
meant that once the Emperor nominally approved troop movements in China, the 
remainder of the government was obliged to toe the line. Elements of strategic culture 
help explain strange tactics that when viewed rationally did not support broader strategic 
aims. 
 From the Chinese case, from a realist perspective it may not have been rational 
for China to be so concerned about military action by foreign forces in countries around 
it. The Korean War was a warning to Chinese leaders that the western powers desired 
influence in Asia and could inflict serious harm to Chinese interests, but it also showed 
that no western powers had the military capability to seriously harm China in 
conventional warfare. A realist would be concerned about military buildups near borders, 
but it seems unlikely that a realist would be as worried about the influence of the United 
States as much as Zhou Enlai did at Geneva.  
 The strategic culture perspective would consider China’s history of foreign 
invasions, particularly with Japan, and a cautiousness toward foreigners as reasons for 
why Zhou behaved in this way. While foreign militaries did not pose an existential threat 
to China, they could still do serious harm to Chinese society, as the Japanese invasions 
showed. The strategic culture approach does not entirely explain why leaders and states 
acted in the way they did, but it adds to understanding of interactions by showing 
perspectives that are missed by realism, adding context to complex issues. 
 The operational code approach offers fine-grained analysis of how leaders 
thought. Realism provides an overarching view of state desires. Operational code 
provides a perspective on decision making that could be missed by realism—a 
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perspective on the rationale behind why leaders make decisions that goes beyond 
structural statements. The ability to identify that leaders were more open to cooperation 
relative to each other or were more flexible in changing their tactics adds value to 
analysis of events. Realism could explain why, but it does not always explain how. 
 For example, the operational code perspective could partially explain why the 
Japanese government debated diplomatic action toward the United States and other Allies 
even while it prepared for war. The scores from analysis of Japanese documents showed 
that Japanese leaders viewed the natural state of the world as closer to harmony than 
conflict with scores similar to Bill Clinton and Lyndon Johnson, but that they were highly 
willing to change tactics from cooperative to conflictual. This willingness to shift 
priorities tactics, greater than the Chinese scores or Lyndon Johnson’s, implies that the 
Japanese were willing to pursue a hedging strategy involving diplomatic action and then 
return to conflictual strategies for longer than leadership groups with lower scores. This 
helps to explain the length of the pursuit of diplomacy, as well as its discussion in 
Japanese leadership meetings, which realism does not do as good of a job at discussing. 
 Therefore, the value of strategic culture and operational code analysis is primarily 
in understanding in better detail the complexities of strategic interactions and how they 
affect the paths that states choose. In some instances, it could even be possible to use 
strategic culture analysis to understand aims of states beyond acquiring security or power; 
understanding intermediate steps to achieve those ends could be as valuable as 
understanding the ends themselves. Why did the Japanese use China as a stepping stone 
to greatness? Such a question could be answered with a realist argument, but the 
understanding of why and how they did so is greatly enriched with analysis by strategic 
culture and operational code analysis. 
 From this perspective, strategic culture, operational code, and similar methods of 
analysis are not mutually exclusive from realism. Rather than being viewed as in 
opposition to realist ideas, it could be better to think of them as complementary to each 
other and to realism more generally. Although they may not hold primacy in predicting 
state behavior, they help greatly to understand state behavior, which is needed in the 




 This thesis has examined Japanese and Chinese decision making through 
perspectives. By way of strategic culture and operational code analysis, it has considered 
aspects of decision making related to a specific historical event for each case. This thesis 
has shown that a holistic approach to decision making that uses elements of both lenses 
adds value that studies conducted focusing on just one cannot. It has also shown that 
research on Japanese and Chinese decision making could be improved by such this 
methodology, as this thesis produced somewhat different results from the literature. This 
chapter will summarize the contributions of this thesis, comment on the state of decision-
making research more generally, and then discuss potential for future research in decision 
making as well as in Japanese and Chinese research. It will also relate the contributions 
of this thesis to the current strategic situation and discuss lessons learned that could be 
applied to United States interactions with Japan and China. 
B. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS THESIS 
This thesis makes several contributions to the study of Chinese and Japanese 
decision making. Some are country-specific, while others apply to the study of strategic 
decision making generally. First, Japanese decision making was highly influenced by a 
cabinet-style decision-making structure that encouraged decentralization and independent 
action. While the structure itself was hierarchical, driven by the prime minister and 
emperor, and was highly subject to militaristic tendencies. Prior analyses of decision 
making did not consider the importance of the cabinet structure in enabling individual 
ministers to take action on their own and thus drive decision making in a certain 
direction. In a past study, Snyder considered the reasons for Japanese overexpansion, 
concluding that it was caused by strategic myths, an irrational strategic gamble, domestic 
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institutions dominated by the military, and a cartelized political system.74 Apart from 
these factors, this thesis adds analysis of decision-making units and considers the way in 
which domestic institutions were dominated by civilian leaders with militarist bents, 
which Synder does not emphasize as much. It also argues against the idea of a cartelized, 
centralized decision-making system. 
Past work has also neglected a quantitative approach that this thesis provided, 
considering the body of discussions had by Japanese leaders in a way that captured all of 
what they were thinking, not just focusing on important things they said. This led to the 
conclusion that Japanese decision making, while militaristic, was not as warlike as past 
research has suggested. The reason Japan went to war is possibly due to the structure of 
its decision-making process leaving it little other options. Put another way, when 
considering the social and organizational factors, it is not unreasonable to think that the 
Japanese were rational to declare war, and it is not surprising that they did so. 
 For Chinese decision making, prior analyses have focused on the dominance of 
Mao Zedong in shaping Chinese thought. This study showed that while Mao possibly set 
the tone for Chinese politics, it was clearly a team process that operated through 
deliberations that set policy to be carried out to the letter by those in the field. This study 
showed the challenges posed by the strategic culture approach, ultimately concluding that 
Chinese decision making did not show appreciable elements of strategic culture as posed 
by the existing literature, although elements of the operational code still persist. Despite 
the fact that strategic culture elements were not demonstrated, this thesis still showed the 
extent to which Chinese leaders thought in terms of their history and culture when 
thinking about strategic issues. Finally, this thesis showed that Chinese leaders, despite 
their hesitance and caution toward foreigners, were remarkably willing to engage in 
cooperative action when it was necessary. 
 The results of this thesis can also be applied to some elements of decision making 
in general. It shows that cultural characteristics, in general, play a large role in the ways 
leaders think and make decisions. While structural factors, like the balance of power in 
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the international system or the amount of military power a state may possess, are 
important, the way they are translated into action is through the lens of culture. Culture 
will filter the data that leaders pay attention to and make some things appear to be more 
important than others; while a great deal of data may be available to leaders, they decide 
what to use to justify their decisions due to cultural characteristics.  
C. CHALLENGES FACED BY THIS THESIS 
 While this research methodology has yielded results that provide for a much 
clearer characterization of Chinese and Japanese decision making, there are specific 
challenges with each of the lenses that bear comment for future improvement. Overall, 
the study of strategic decision making is hampered by the prevalence of institutional 
firewalls that prevent the sharing of information and methodology between and within 
disciplines. While political science research has made great strides in incorporating 
knowledge from other disciplines, a truly interdisciplinary approach remains elusive. The 
development of such a research design would greatly aid in understanding challenging 
strategic questions. 
 Strategic culture theory, as mentioned in Chapters I and II, has exhibited 
significant evolution in the last two decades. But there remain some challenges in 
“operationalizing” this set of ideas. In particular, it is often difficult to demonstrate what 
is and is not strategic culture. Without overt references to elements of Chinese or 
Japanese history or philosophy, it is difficult to argue that any individual tendency or trait 
is indicative of a broader strategic culture. Leaders may act cautiously just as a matter of 
course, not because of some desire stemming from thousands of years of history. This 
problem is difficult to resolve, as it limits the illuminating power of the model if only the 
most obvious evidence is included.  
 Quantitative research can be a useful tool for assessing strategic culture. When 
combined with the concrete criteria mentioned above and a large volume of data, 
statistical methods could be useful in analyzing the influence of strategic culture. One 
could imagine a series of regressions that take into account other factors that could have 
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influenced decision making. But, as mentioned, this should not be undertaken without a 
firm research design that accurately captures the impact of strategic culture. 
 The operational code analysis methodology suffers from concerns of a different 
nature. The first issue is the nature of sources used in this thesis: neither the Japanese nor 
Chinese documents speak with a unified voice. Put another way, operational code 
methodology in the past has been most often applied to individuals, considering the 
public statements and writings of a single person to determine their own operational code. 
Leites’ original work on operational code, of course, focused on the Soviet Politburo, but 
most of the subsequent work has involved individuals. In theory, this should not create 
major problems. Instead of determining the operational code of a single person, it would 
look at the code of a ruling body, in line with Leites’ original methodology.  
 The problem with this set of data, at least for the Chinese case, is that it does not 
examine an entire body of people. For the Chinese case, it focuses mostly on Zhou Enlai, 
with assorted statements from other members of the Chinese delegation and some policy 
guidance from Beijing. But this study cannot be claimed to be an example of decision 
making representative of the Politburo as a whole. In this thesis it was considered as 
decision making of the Chinese government at the Geneva Conference, which is probably 
the most accurate description of how operational code analysis was used. This concern 
should not affect the outcomes in a meaningful way, but they should be interpreted with 
this in mind. 
 The use of computer software to conduct this analysis is another concern; if the 
actual tool used for analysis is not well understood by the researcher, the results could be 
easily misinterpreted. This is a common problem among regression analysis—statistical 
software packages have made it easier than ever to utilize complex regressions in 
academic research, leading to regressions being found in many disciplines where it was 
never used before. Often, this sort of research suffers from fundamental flaws due to poor 
research design. The same could be true of the usage of operational code software here. 
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D. IMPLICATIONS FOR DECISION MAKING RESEARCH 
There are some implications for decision-making research in general that come 
from this analysis. Decision-making analysis involving traditional methods goes far to 
explain how people think and how they make decisions. However, a criticism of this 
research could be the argument that it is impossible to ever capture the entirety of what 
leaders think and that any results only represent broad approximations of reality. While 
all research is like to this to some extent, an attempt to draw a general picture, when it 
comes to analyzing human beings it could be more difficult because of how complex 
individuals are. To make a representation of an individual’s thinking less approximate 
and more concrete, it would be necessary to know many facts about his childhood, 
education, family, and what other factors influence his life not just directly, but also 
indirectly.  
 This is relatively easy to do with individuals, but it is rarely individuals who make 
decisions that change history. They almost always work as part of a larger team and make 
decisions incorporating their ideas. Whether an individual is a dictator or a member of an 
elected cabinet, he will not be able to take unilateral action; he will always be subject to 
the abilities and thinking of the collective to accomplish goals. In this line of thinking, the 
individual is less important as a decision-maker, because while one person can have a 
large influence on a body, it still takes a collective to make a final decision. 
 What relation does this viewpoint have with decision-making analysis? It 
validates research methods that emphasize the importance of understanding groups. 
Applying strategic culture and operational code analysis to a larger group makes sense in 
this mindset, it is the group that decides. While Leites’ original work on operational code 
was done with the Soviet Politburo as a group in mind, most of the subsequent research 
in that field has been in looking at individuals. While that is interesting and provides 
some insights into why certain decisions were made, it is difficult to argue that those 
studies accurately capture decision-making styles or processes.  
 There is room for another way of thinking about decision making: decision 
making as expressed through organizations. Organizations are the entities that provide 
structure to our lives; they shape the way information is processed and how leaders have 
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access to both information and decision structures. Culture exists in society, but it is 
organizations that translate culture into something tangible with which leaders interact, 
serving at the same time as manifestations of culture by their very structure and 
transmitting cultural values both within and without. 
 Given the importance of organizations in determining how leaders make 
decisions, it is surprising that organization science has not enjoyed larger prominence in 
decision-making research. A possible way to improve the study of decision making could 
be to begin incorporating such ideas. One way of doing that is by thinking about the 
Garbage Can Model. The GCM, first articulated by Cohen et al. in 1972, is a model of 
organizational decision making that considers decision making in the context of an 
organized anarchy.75 From this point of view, organizations are collections of ideas 
looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations, solutions 
looking for issues, and decision-makers looking for work.  
E.  POSSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Within the framework of strategic culture and operational code analysis there are 
many directions this research could be extended aside from simply incorporating lessons 
from other disciplines. Other than organization science, decision-making research could 
draw from elements of psychology and sociology research to understand the underlying 
cognitive processes that drive behavior. This is in line with the idea that not only do 
people process information differently, but they also select which information to use and 
which to ignore. 
 For strategic culture research, more focused case study analyses like the ones 
presented in this thesis could be useful in developing focused conceptions of a state’s 
strategic culture. The problem with analysis that extends over a long period is that while 
breadth increases, depth decreases dramatically. It is simply not possible to consider a 
state’s strategic culture as well due to limitations in data and processing ability. It could 
also lead to confirmation bias, as a researcher could cite or focus on only the pieces of 
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evidence in a sample that matches his conception of strategic culture, not being willing to 
or being able to look at all the documents in the sample to see if the conception is true in 
reality.  
 For operational code research, a greater emphasis could be paid to considering 
operational code constructs of larger groups of decision-makers. This thesis has shown 
the value of expanding operational code analysis from an individual leader to a closer 
approximation of reality: a decision-making body like a cabinet. Methodological 
concerns remain with this approach. For example, it is unclear whether it is more 
valuable to assess the discussions of such a body in transcript form, or whether enough 
value would come from considering the policy documents such a body would produce. 
These are areas that future research could explore, returning operational code analysis 
back to its roots as Leites envisioned it capturing the spirit of a ruling body. 
 Research on the case study of Japanese decision making prior to the Pacific War 
could move forward with biographical assessments of the actors at the liaison 
conferences, as well as a clearer understanding of the staff structure and the extent to 
which middle-ranking aides played a role in drafting policy and influencing the key 
decision-makers. To some extent this has been done, as biographies have been written of 
actors like Tojo Hideki and the Emperor Hirohito, but biographical research into the other 
ministers could illuminate what was in their minds as they debated the decision to go to 
war. Understanding structure of the staff supporting the liaison conferences would help 
greatly in knowing the bureaucratic politics behind decisions.  
 The Chinese case could be improved with a translation and analysis of the 
transcripts of the Politburo meetings where Chinese leaders discussed the Geneva 
Conference. Since the Chinese government is unlikely to release these, it would be 
useful, like in the Japanese case, to conduct biographical research on the actors making 
and enacting decisions at Geneva. Looking at memoirs they may have published, 
speeches they gave, and what was said about them in other contexts could be useful for 
understanding the context behind their decision making.  
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F. APPLICATION TO MODERN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 
1. Japan 
The thing most unique to Japan that comes out of this analysis is the idea that 
when nationalism is coupled with a struggling economic system and a political system 
that seemingly gives rewards when faced with a fait accompli, a state could  be much 
more prone to going to war. This happened in Japan due to elements of Japanese culture 
and history, which included conservatism and militarism. Such factors led to authority 
not being challenged and militarism left unchecked.  
 Does militarism still exist in Japanese society? The answer is probably not – 
Japanese society was imbued with a strong pacifistic streak following the end of the war; 
the national military is called the Self-Defense Force, and aggression is not allowed under 
the Japanese constitution. However, this trend could be changing. Recent scholarship has 
examined whether or not Japanese society could soon cast off pacifism and reaffirm a 
commitment to offensive military action as a useful political tool.76 In the face of a 
weakening global economy and the rising powers of China, India, and Russia nearby, is it 
possible that Japanese militarism could see a return? After all, right-wing parties still 
exist in Japan. This may be out of the realm of possibility, but regardless, it would be 
wise to pay close attention to Japanese reactions to expansionist powers and economic 
weakening to see whether elements of decision making from 1941 resurface. 
 Another element of decision making that could persist is conservatism. 
Conservatism permeated Japanese thought in 1941. Conservatism of that sort is difficult 
to eliminate, and while it can argued that all leaders are to some extent risk-averse, it is 
possible that such aversion to risks has persisted to the present day. This would mean that 
Japanese leaders would be less likely to accept innovative new ideas. The extent to which 
the Japanese government is willing to adopt new ideas should be watched in the future, 
for during a crisis situation it would  be useful to know whether Japanese leaders would 
take a known path or not.  
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2. China 
Chinese cultural characteristics like distrust of foreigners and a desire to secure 
China’s geopolitical position highly influenced Chinese decision making at Geneva, and 
they persist to this day. Ideology highly influenced Chinese discussions internally and 
externally at the Geneva Conference, and while this may have softened somewhat with a 
new generation of leadership, it probably persists. In Chinese decision making, these 
factors will weighed during any interaction, with an eye at satisfying ideology and 
preserving those two important factors. This does not mean that Chinese leaders are 
blindly driven by ideology; rather, the discussions at Geneva show that Chinese leaders 
are savvy political actors who understand that ideology must sometimes bend in the face 
of reality.  
 Because of realities like a relative lack of military and economic power, Chinese 
leaders were willing to engage in cooperation with some of their greatest enemies for the 
sake of preserving stability and their government. One of the mantras of the modern 
Chinese government is stability in the name of economic development. With an 
imbalance in military and economic power between China and the United States existing 
now, though that gap is narrowing, it is possible that Chinese leaders will be willing to 
engage with the United States and other world powers and seek to avoid conflict, at least 
until the power gap narrows. For the United States this is double-edged: while it means 
cooperation with the Chinese government is more likely, it raises the question of whether 
that cooperation comes with a price or will be taken away once the Politburo determines 
that it is no longer necessary. 
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